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Abstract
This dissertation examines the relationship between Theory of Mind (ToM) and Executive
Function (EF). There has been debate on whether ToM and EF are two facets of the same
process or are two distinct processes. Distinguishing between these possibilities empirically
is challenging because the two abilities have similar developmental timetables and ToM tasks
typically place high demands on EF, with the consequence that ToM and EF performance
measures may be artificially correlated. Three experiments explored the nature of this
relationship. Experiments 1 and 2 tested whether socio-cultural factors known to influence
individual differences in EF (i.e., bilingualism, country-of-origin) extend to differences in
ToM. If ToM and EF are two facets of the same process, then the pattern of differences in EF
related to the socio-cultural factors and the pattern of differences in ToM should be
comparable. Findings suggest that country-of-origin (but not language status) contributed to
differences in EF (Experiment 1). In contrast, neither country-of-origin nor language status
was associated with ToM (Experiment 2). Experiment 3 examined whether aging adults’
performance in ToM tasks improves when EF demands are reduced. The results
demonstrated that older adults showed intact ToM despite their deficits in EF when reducing
cognitive load in a ToM task, implying that correlations between ToM and EF performance
may be artificially elevated. Implications of these findings for understanding the relationship
between ToM and EF, and suggestions for future studies, are discussed.

Keywords
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Summary for Lay Audience
This dissertation examines the relationship between Theory of Mind (ToM: the ability to
understand others’ mind) and Executive Function (EF; a set of cognitive processes necessary
for attaining a goal, including the abilities to control one’s attention, plan a strategy, and
remember an instruction). It is unclear whether these two abilities stem from one process or
are distinct processes. Progress on these issues is slow in part because EF and ToM develop
on similar timelines and are measured using similar tasks. Three experiments addressed these
issues. Experiments 1 and 2 tested whether individual differences in children’s EF related to
socio-cultural factors (i.e., bilingualism and country-of-origin) extend to differences in ToM.
Experiment 3 tested whether aging adults’ performance in a ToM task changed when EF
demands of the task were reduced. Results from all three experiments suggest that EF and
ToM are distinct processes. Experiments 1 and 2 found that Korean children, regardless of
their language status, outperformed Caucasian counterparts on an EF task, but were
indistinguishable from Caucasian children on a ToM task. Experiment 3 found that older
adults’ performance in ToM improved when EF demands in the ToM measure were reduced.
The results shed new light on a long-standing debate in Psychology.
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Chapter 1

1

Introduction

Across evolutionary history, there is a co-emergence of a variety of higher-order
cognitive functions, including language, executive function (EF), social cognition, and
symbolizing abilities. Together, this suite of cognitive functions distinguishes modern
humans from non-human primates, including old/new world monkeys and great apes.
Similarly, there is a rapid co-emergence of these cognitive functions in early childhood
development. This raises challenging questions on the relationship between different
cognitive domains, such as whether distinct cognitive functions co-emerge or one key
domain (e.g., domain-general learning mechanism) emerges from which different
cognitive functions develop.
On one view, the human mind consists of distinct modules (domain-specificity), each
shaped by natural selection and specialized for solving different adaptive problems
(Cosmides & Tooby, 1997). For example, ancestral human beings who had neural
circuits that made them good at predicting what others want by using others’ eye
direction would increase their probability of getting along well with other group
members, and this would increase their probability of survival due to successful social
interaction. In contrast, not having those neural circuits would increase the probability of
individuals being excluded from a group, and this would decrease their probability of
survival. Since neural circuits are passed on to offspring, there will be more individuals
with these circuits in next generation. Over countless generations, these neural circuits
become “mind-reading” modules that modern human beings currently have. Likewise,
other cognitive functions, such as perception and language, have evolved to distinct
modules so that we have a diversity of distinct modules. These distinct modules enable
humans to readily pay more attention to some specific information relative to others to
solve specific problems.
An alternative view is that humans are equipped with domain-general (or domain-free)
mechanisms that are applied to diverse problems. The ‘new thinking’ perspective
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proposes that the mind is like “a multi-purpose instrument (Heyes, 2012, p.2092)”
because the human mind is capable of performing a variety of both specific (e.g., mindreading; Buchsbaum, Bridgers, Weisberg, & Gopnik, 2012), and general tasks (e.g.,
problem-solving, planning; Chiappe & MacDonald, 2005).
Are theory of mind (or mind-reading; hereafter, ToM), the ability to predict behaviour
from inferred mental states, and executive function (EF), supported by distinct modules
or are they based on a single domain-general process? The current work examines the
relationship between ToM, especially false-belief reasoning, and EF. Although ToM and
EF have been suggested to be highly associated with each other, whether ToM and EF are
truly interrelated is still controversial. The main focus of the current work lies in
providing a comprehensive overview of the relationship between ToM and EF and a
greater understanding of the relationship via empirical research.
In the following sections, prior literature on ToM, EF, and the relationship between ToM
and EF is reviewed.

1.1 Theory of Mind
Theory of Mind refers to the ability to understand others’ mental states, such as beliefs,
wishes, intentions, knowledge, desires, and so on, in order to predict their behavior even
if their mental states are different from our own. Since such states are not observable but
enable individual to make predictions based on the inference of the mental states, it has
been viewed as a theory (Premack & Woodruff, 1978).
False-belief understanding, one of the dimensions of ToM and the focus of the current
work, is more dependent on higher-order social cognitive abilities than other dimensions
of ToM (i.e., emotion or desire understanding). For example, desire understanding simply
involves recognizing another person’s subjective attitude toward the world. Successful
false-belief understanding, however, requires that an individual realizes that: (1) another
person has a representation of the world; and (2) the contents of the others’ representation
may reflect reality or may be different from the reality (Wellman, Cross, & Watson,
2001). Thus, false-belief understanding is generally considered a higher-order form of
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ToM reasoning and is often used as a marker of ToM development (Carlson, Moses, &
Hix, 1998a; Devine & Hughes, 2018; Liu, Wellman, Tardif, & Sabbagh, 2008).
One task frequently used to measure false-belief understanding in children is a “changein-location” false-belief task (Wimmer & Perner, 1983). In one popular variant, the
“Sally-Anne task”, a child participant with a story about two characters (Sally and Ann)
who know that a ball is in a basket. During Sally’s absence, Ann moves the ball from the
basket to a box. The critical question is where Sally will look for the ball when she comes
back. To correctly answer the question, children need to distinguish between their own
true belief about the location of the ball and Sally’s false belief that the ball is still located
in the basket. Another widely used false-belief understanding task is the “unexpectedcontents” false-belief task (Gopnik & Astington, 1988). In a popular variant, the
“Smarties task”, a child is shown a candy box (i.e., “Smarties”), but then discovers upon
opening it that the box actually has unexpected contents (e.g., crayons) instead of
expected contents (i.e., smarties). After closing the box, the child is asked about what
another person ‘X’ who has not seen inside the box would think is inside it. Since X does
not know that the box actually contains crayons, X would falsely believe that the candy
box contained candies as it appears.
Four- and five-year-old children often give correct answers to the critical questions in
false-belief tasks, whereas younger children give answers corresponding to their own
beliefs or reality, rather than another person’s belief (Gopnik & Slaughter, 1991;
Wimmer & Perner, 1983). Preschool-aged children show consistent and robust
development of false-belief understanding, irrespective of ToM task types and countries
of origin (Wellman et al., 2001). The development of false-belief understanding
continues and becomes increasingly complex through adolescence and young adulthood
(Blakemore, 2012; Dumontheil, Apperly, & Blakemore, 2010).
At the other end of the lifespan, the ability to understand others’ false beliefs typically
declines (but see Happé, Winner, & Brownell, 1998; MacPherson, Phillips, & Della Sala,
2002; Saltzman, Strauss, Hunter, & Archibald, 2000 for exceptions). For example, in one
of the typically used false-belief tasks for adults (a modified version of the “change-in-
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location” false-belief task for children), adults are presented with a story or video
demonstrating a protagonist’s false-belief or true-belief/the reality of a situation. For
example, the protagonist sees that an object is located in Location A. The object is then
moved to Location B during the protagonist’s absence (false-belief condition) or presence
(true-belief condition). Adult participants are then asked to predict where the protagonist
would look for the object. The correct answer depends on conditions (i.e., false-belief
condition: Location A; true-belief condition: Location B). Older adults made more errors
in the false-belief condition compared to young adults, whereas, in the control condition
that did not involve any mentalizing skills, they made fewer errors (Bailey & Henry,
2008) or they did not differ in performance from young adults (German & Hehman,
2006; Phillips et al., 2011). This is surprising given that older adults have accumulated
considerable social experience and wisdom (Randall, 2013; Tentori, Osherson, Hasher, &
May, 2001). One possibility is that age-related ToM decline is linked to the deterioration
of EF (German & Hehman, 2006; Phillips et al., 2011). Questions concerning the
relationship between ToM (specifically, false-belief understanding) and EF in older
adults will be addressed in detail in section 1.3.
In conclusion, false-belief understanding follows an inverted U-shape across the lifespan.
It rapidly develops between the ages of 3- and 5-years, continues to develop through
adolescence and early adulthood, and then declines in late adulthood. This developmental
trajectory is very similar to that of EF (Carlson & Moses, 2001; Carlson, Moses, &
Breton, 2002; Frye, Zelazo, & Palfai, 1995; Hughes & Ensor, 2005), suggesting perhaps
that ToM and EF are fundamentally linked.

1.2 Executive Function
Executive function (EF) is an umbrella term that refers to a set of cognitive processes that
support goal-directed behaviour (Baddeley, 1996; Miyake & Friedman, 2012), including
working memory, planning, inhibitory control, attention, and shifting.
Different tasks are used to measure EF of individuals of different ages. One task used to
measure EF in children is the day/night Stroop task (Gerstadt, Hong, & Diamond, 1994).
In this task, children are shown two cards, one white card with a sun drawn on it and a
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second black card with a moon drawn on it. They are then instructed to say “day” for the
moon card and “night” for the sun card. Similarly, in Luria’s hand game (Luria, Pribram,
& Homskaya, 1964), children first learn two different hand gestures (e.g., making a fist
and pointing with an index finger). They are then instructed to make the opposite gesture
to the experimenter’s gesture (e.g., when the experimenter makes a fist, the children need
to point with a finger). These two tasks are considered measures of response inhibition
because they require children to inhibit a prepotent response in favour of an alternative
behaviour. Another common task for measuring EF in young children is the Dimensional
Change Card Sort task (DCCS; Zelazo, 2006). In this task, children are presented with
two boxes, each marked with a bidimensional target (e.g., a red rabbit and a blue truck).
In pre-switch trials, children begin by sorting test cards that match each of the targets on
a single dimension (i.e., blue rabbits and red trucks) according to one dimension (e.g.,
colour; all the red cards should go into the box with a red rabbit and all the blue cards
should go into the box with a blue truck). Following 5 to 10 pre-switch trials, children are
instructed to switch and sort the cards by the second dimension (e.g., shape; all the rabbit
cards should go into the box with a red rabbit and all the truck cards should go into the
box with a blue truck). The post-switch, therefore, requires children to inhibit the use of
an old rule and shift and use a new rule.
For adolescents and adults, one commonly used measure of EF is the Stroop task. In the
task, participants are given a list of words (e.g., red, blue, green, and so on) and are
instructed to not read the words but instead name the colour of the font. In some cases,
the colour of the words is matched with the meaning of the words (e.g., the word ‘red’
written in red) and in other cases, the colour of the words is mismatched with meaning
(e.g., the word ‘blue’ written in red). The former cases refer to congruent trials and the
latter cases refer to incongruent trials. Participants are typically faster and show more
accurate on congruent trials compared to incongruent trials (Jensen & Rohwer, 1966;
MacLeod, 1991) possibly because incongruent trials require over-practiced word reading
to be inhibited in favour of color naming. One representative task for measuring working
memory capacity is the memory span task. In this task, participants are presented with a
list of items (including letters or numbers) and they are then asked to recall the items in
correct order (forward) or in reverse order (backward). The highest number of correctly
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recalled items is considered as individual’s working memory span. Finally, one common
measure of adults’ flexibility is the Wisconsin Card Sort Task (WCST; Grant & Berg,
1948). In the WCST, participants are asked to sort cards with diverse symbols according
to either colour, shape, or the number of the symbols. The only feedback available to
participants is whether each match they make is correct or not so that participants have to
infer how to match the cards correctly based on the feedback and change their strategy
when a specific match is incorrect.
With these various EF tasks, it has been found that EF rapidly improves in preschoolaged children (Diamond & Taylor, 1996; Hughes, 1998) as they age. For example,
children aged between 3 and 5 years show rapid development of EF even after controlling
for verbal ability (Carlson, 2005). EF continues to develop through elementary school age
and adolescence. During elementary school years, children show marked improvement in
working memory (Siegel, 1994) and set-shifting (Cepeda, Kramer, & Gonzalez de Sather,
2001; Rosselli & Ardila, 1993). For example, children show sharp improvement in
various working memory span tasks between the ages of 4 ½- and 8-years and gradual
improvement after the ages of 10 years (Case, 1992). In addition, elementary school
children become progressively insightful about their own mental processing and can exert
greater conscious control over their thoughts and actions (Flavell, Green, & Flavell,
2000).
During adolescence, EF continuously and gradually develops (Huizinga, Dolan, & van
der Molen, 2006; Kleibeuker, De Dreu, & Crone, 2013; Peters, Van Duijvenvoorde,
Koolschijn, & Crone, 2016). For example, working memory develops until the age of 21
and set-shifting and inhibition develops until the age of 15 (Huizinga et al., 2006).
Although EF subcomponents seem to show different developmental courses, EF reaches
its peak during adolescence. Through adulthood, EF performance stabilizes (Peters et al.,
2016) or even slightly decreases (e.g., on divergent thinking tasks, Kleibeuker, De Dreu,
& Crone, 2013; on spatial divergent tasks, Kleibeuker, Koolschijn, et al., 2013). One
reason why EF development may be so protracted is that the prefrontal cortex (PFC), an
area of the brain associated with executive functioning, is slow to develop. Like EF, the
PFC continues to develop until early adulthood (Crone, Donohue, Honomichl,
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Wendelken, & Bunge, 2006; Huttenlocher & Dabholkar, 1997; Moriguchi & Hiraki,
2013; Morton, Bosma, & Ansari, 2009).
In late-adulthood, although people vary substantially in cognitive aging (Cabeza,
Anderson, Locantore, & McIntosh, 2002; Rosen et al., 2002), in general, aging is
associated with a decline in EF. Older adults show deficits on attentional tasks (e.g.,
showing larger cost effects of dividing attention during a dual task, McDowd & Craik,
1988; Verhaeghen, Steitz, Sliwinski, & Cerella, 2003), working memory tasks (Salthouse
& Babcock, 1991), and inhibitory control tasks (e.g., showing slower reaction times to
target stimuli while ignoring irrelevant stimuli, McDowd & Shaw, 2000; West, 2004). As
mentioned earlier, structural and functional changes in the PFC that occur with age (e.g.,
cortical thinning in the PFC with age, age-related changes in the PFC activity) may play a
role in age-related decline of EF (Burzynska et al., 2012; Chao & Knight, 1997; Rypma
& D’Esposito, 2000; West, 1996).
In sum, EF rapidly develop in childhood, and some of EF subcomponents (i.e., inhibition,
shifting) mature and stabilize in early adolescence, whereas other EF subcomponents
(i.e., working memory) continue to develop into early adulthood. As seniors age, the
opposite pattern is observed, with prominent age-related decline in across multiple
domains of EF. Thus, the development of EF follows an inverted U-shape, similar to the
developmental course of ToM.

1.3 The relationship between Theory of Mind and Executive
Function
The fact that ToM and EF follow similar developmental trajectories suggests that these
abilities may be closely related. One possibility is that ToM and EF both rely on use of
the same higher-order representations. For example, Cognitive Complexity and Control
theory (Frye, Zelazo, & Burack, 1998) stipulates that ToM, especially false-belief
understanding, is simply one form of a domain-general reasoning skill involving use of
higher-order rules. For example, in the “change-in-location” false-belief task, one is able
to predict where another person will look for an object using if-if-then rules, without
inferring his/her mental states (e.g., “if he/she saw that the object was located in a box A,
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if he/she did not see that the change of the object’s location (from the box A to a box B),
then the box A”). Thus, false-belief understanding may involve use of general higherorder rules that are not unique reasoning about mental states.
An alternative possibility is that ToM and EF are grounded in common domain-general
working memory and inhibitory control processes (Moses, 2001). For example, in falsebelief tasks, one has to suppress salient information regarding reality or one’s
perspective/belief (inhibitory control) and hold in mind not only one’s own mental state
but the mental state of another person (working memory). Thus, EF has been proposed to
be closely related to ToM.
Empirically, ToM and EF are often correlated. For example, preschoolers’ performance
on false-belief tasks and EF tasks are correlated even when age, gender, and verbal ability
are partialled out (Carlson & Moses, 2001; Frye et al., 1995). Although there are mixed
results on the direction of the relationship with a longitudinal study design (e.g., early EF
predicts later false-belief understanding: Hughes, 1998; Hughes & Ensor, 2007 vs. early
ToM including false-belief understanding predicts later EF: McAlister & Peterson, 2013),
the results suggest a close association between ToM and EF. A strong link between ToM
(specifically, false belief understanding) and EF has also been found in middle childhood
(children aged 6-11 years; Austin, Groppe, & Elsner, 2014; Devine et al., 2016).
Relatedly, ToM and EF appear inter-related in children with autism. For example, autistic
children show deficits on not only ToM tasks but EF tasks (Ozonoff, Pennington, &
Rogers, 1991; Rumsey & Hamburger, 1990), and the developmental trajectories of ToM
and EF in autistic children are similar (Ozonoff & McEvoy, 1994).
The strong relationship between false-belief understanding and EF can also be found in
adulthood. It has been suggested that the age-related deterioration of false-belief
understanding is associated with the decline of EF. For example, adults’ performance on
a false-belief task is significantly correlated with EF, specifically, working memory,
inhibitory control, and speed of processing (German & Hehman, 2006). Indeed, there is
evidence that EF statistically mediates the age-related decline of ToM (Bailey & Henry,
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2008; Charlton, Barrick, Markus, & Morris, 2009; Phillips et al., 2011). These findings
are suggestive of a highly interdependent relationship between ToM and EF.
Regarding how EF relates to ToM, two general possibilities have been proposed (Carlson
& Moses, 2001; Carlson et al., 2002), but there have been controversies over it.
According to emergence account, EF is necessary for the emergence of ToM ability so
that EF is required for children to understand mental state concepts, such as beliefs,
wishes, and intentions. Empirically, there is evidence supporting this account in that early
EF predicts later false-belief understanding (Hughes, 1998; Hughes & Ensor, 2007)
despite the empirical results favouring the opposite pattern (i.e., early ToM predicts later
EF; McAlister & Peterson, 2013). On the other hand, expression account posits that EF is
necessary to display one’s mentalizing ability. According to this account, children
already have ToM competence, but the EF demands that a ToM task requires to perform
may impede their successful performance on a ToM task. The evidence showing that
children’s performance on a ToM task increased when the inhibitory control demands
that the ToM task imposes were reduced (Carlson, Moses, & Hix, 1998b) seems to favour
the expression account. Another piece of evidence, however, is inconsistent with the
expression account in that lowering EF demands of ToM tasks did not influence
children’s performance (Wellman et al., 2001). Thus, it is still unclear on how ToM and
EF relate to each other.
At the same time, it has been proposed that ToM and EF are distinct processes.
According to one evolutionary theory (Tooby & Cosmides, 1997), ToM is supported by a
module dedicated to solving specific social cognition problems. In this account, over
successive generations, the human social environment puts evolutionary pressure on the
individual’s capacity to solve social challenges (e.g., identifying others who would
cooperate and who would cheat; Cosmides, 1989; Trivers, 1971), which has evolved into
a ToM module.
Empirically, considerable evidence suggests that ToM and EF are distinct. For example,
autistic children show deficits in ToM tasks, but not in control tasks that involve nonmental reasoning but require similar EF loads to ToM tasks (Charman & Baron‐Cohen,

10

1992; Leslie & Thaiss, 1992), implying that ToM is a specialized and independent
module. In addition, neuroimaging studies (Saxe & Kanwisher, 2003; Saxe, Schulz, &
Jiang, 2006; Saxe & Wexler, 2005) identify the right temporo-parietal junction (rTPJ) as
a brain area uniquely engaged by mentalizing tasks. Thus, given the inconsistent findings
on the relationship between ToM and EF, it is uncertain whether the two abilities are
based on one common process or are distinct processes.

1.4 Empirical challenges to testing the nature of the
relationship between Theory of Mind and Executive
Function
ToM and EF have similar developmental timetables. However, it is unclear whether the
close co-development of ToM and EF is merely coincidental or indicative of a close
fundamental link. Making matters more complicated, tasks used to study ToM in children
and adults typically place high demands on EF, with the consequence that ToM and EF
might appear to be correlated due to methodological artifacts. For example, in standard
false-belief tasks (in other words, elicited-response or explicit false-belief tasks),
participants have to provide a verbal response indicating another person’s belief.
Consequently, these types of tasks impose high cognitive demands (i.e., inhibiting a
prepotent response, generating an explicit response), leading to increased similarity
between ToM and EF performance measures. It is conceivable, therefore, that ToM and
EF are statistically correlated but not causally associated.

1.5 The current work’s research questions
The purpose of the current work is to examine whether ToM and EF are rooted in a
common process or whether they are distinct processes. In an effort to lend clarity to this
debate, two experiments examined individual differences in ToM and EF in the preschool
period. In Experiments 1 and 2, the relation between ToM and EF was examined by
testing whether socio-cultural factors known to impact differences in EF extend to
differences in ToM. Language status and country-of-origin have been proposed as sociocultural factors known to influence individual’s EF. For example, there is evidence
suggesting that: (1) bilingual children are advantaged in EF compared to monolingual
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children (language status; Bialystok, 1999; Bialystok & Martin, 2004; Carlson &
Meltzoff, 2008); and (2) children from East Asian countries make fewer errors in EF
tasks compared to Caucasian children from Western countries, like Europe and North
America (country-of-origin; Oh & Lewis, 2008; Sabbagh, Xu, Carlson, Moses, & Lee,
2006). Thus, Experiment 1 tested the effects of language status and country-of-origin on
EF. To that end, the performance of bilingual and monolingual preschool-aged children
of varied national origin on an age-appropriate inhibitory control task was compared.
Experiment 2 then tested whether effects of language status and country-of-origin
(reported in Experiment 1) are observed in ToM.
If ToM and EF are based on a common process, then language status and culture should
exert similar effects on EF and ToM. In other words, the pattern of results for EF due to
the socio-cultural factors (Experiment 1) and the pattern of results for ToM (Experiment
2) are expected to be similar. However, if ToM and EF are distinct processes, then the
effects of language status and country-of-origin on EF shown in Experiment 1 should not
extend to ToM.
Experiment 3 examined whether aging adults with declining EF show impairment in
ToM when tested using a ToM task that places fewer demands on EF. To that end,
younger and older adults were compared on a spontaneous-response (or implicit) ToM
task that imposes fewer demands on EF (Scott, 2017). For example, in spontaneousresponse tasks, participants are not required to explicitly generate verbal responses, but
reveal mental state evaluations through spontaneous actions such as looking behaviours
and spontaneous helping behaviours. Therefore, Experiment 3 explored whether older
adults who are experiencing age-related decline of EF show difficulty in belief-tracking
when tested with a ToM task that places fewer demands on EF resources.
If ToM and EF are based on a common process, then reducing cognitive load required for
performing a ToM task should be of no effect on the nature of the relationship between
ToM and EF. Therefore, it is predicted that older adults believed to be experiencing agerelated decline in EF should show deficits in belief-tracking even when using a
spontaneous-response ToM task. However, if ToM and EF are distinct processes (but
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performance between ToM task and EF task are simply artificially correlated due to
methodological artifacts), then the attempt to lower cognitive demands for performing a
ToM task should lead to dissociation between ToM and EF in older adults. In other
words, it is expected that older adults would show impairment in EF, but not in belieftracking, implying that the strong relationship between ToM and EF reported in the
existing studies is simply due to high cognitive loads that ToM ‘tasks’ require to perform.
The remainder of this dissertation is organized as follow. Chapter 2 (Experiment 1)
explored the effects of socio-cultural factors (i.e., language status and country-of-origin)
on EF. Chapter 3 (Experiment 2) examined whether socio-cultural effects on EF observed
in Chapter 2 (Experiment 1) extend to ToM. Chapter 4 is for integrating and summarizing
the results from Experiments 1 and 2. Chapter 5 (Experiment 3) explored whether
reducing the cognitive demands of ToM tasks influences the relationship between ToM
and EF. Chapter 6 discussed the results from the Experiments 1 to 3 with suggesting
implications and future research in ToM and EF.
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Chapter 2

2

The effects of individual difference in language status
and country of origin on executive function

Four- to five-year-old children have difficulty inhibiting prepotent behaviours (Diamond,
2002). In modified Stroop tasks (Gerstadt et al., 1994), children are presented two images
(e.g., a drawing of the sun and a drawing of the moon) and instructed to select the image
that is weakly associated with a word (e.g., select the image of the moon in response to
the word “day”). Young children typically err by selecting the image that is strongly
associated with the word (e.g., a picture of the sun). Age-related advances in response
inhibition occur throughout this period and are considered part of normative cognitive
development (Kirkham, Cruess, & Diamond, 2003; Morton & Munakata, 2002; Zelazo,
Frye, & Rapus, 1996).
Interestingly, there is evidence that young children who grow up speaking two languages
are advantaged in response inhibition tasks compared to children who grow up speaking
one language (Bialystok & Martin, 2004; Bialystok & Senman, 2004). In one landmark
study, Bialystok (1999) administered an inhibitory control task to Chinese-English
bilingual and English monolingual preschool-aged children. Bilingual children exhibited
greater inhibition than monolingual children in that they were better able to suspend use
of an initial sorting strategy and replace it with another. Response inhibition advantages
favouring bilingual children have since been observed in a range of different tasks
(Bialystok, 2010; Bialystok & Martin, 2004; Carlson & Meltzoff, 2008).
According to the prevailing interpretation (Bialystok, 1999; Bialystok, Klein, Craik, &
Viswanathan, 2004), bilingual children’s advantage in inhibitory control is linked to their
experience managing two languages in daily life. On this view, continued experience
exercising control in this way leads to improvements in inhibition that, in turn, generalize
to problems outside the domain of language via domain-general control processes.
Whether differences in young bilingual and monolingual children’s inhibitory control are
uniquely attributable to differences in language status is, however, hotly debated. Indeed,
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several recent studies reported no association between language status and children’s
inhibitory control (Dick et al., 2018; Duñabeitia et al., 2014), raising questions about the
basis of previously reported language status effects favouring bilingual children.
One possibility – and the focus of the current study – is that performance differences
previously attributed to the effects of language status may actually reflect the influence of
uncontrolled confounding factors (Hartanto & Yang, 2019; Morton & Harper, 2009;
Yang, Yang, & Lust, 2011). In Bialystok’s (1999) landmark comparison of ChineseEnglish and English-speaking children, for example, group differences in inhibitory
control were attributed to the effects of language status. Logically, however, reported
group differences could have been attributed to differences in the country of origin of
these children and their families. Indeed, children from East Asian countries, like Korea,
make fewer errors in inhibition tasks than do Caucasian children from western nations,
like Canada (Oh & Lewis, 2008; Sabbagh, Xu, Carlson, Moses, & Lee, 2006), perhaps
because of differences in their respective collectivist and individualist cultures (ClarkeStewart, Lee, Allhusen, Kim, & McDowell, 2006; Hofstede, 1980). Therefore, to address
this possibility, the current work was conducted.
In the current study, to disentangle confounded language status and country-of-origin
explanations of the bilingual advantage, Korean monolingual kindergartners from Seoul,
South Korea, Korean-English bilingual and English monolingual kindergarteners from
Ontario, Canada were administered a modified Stroop task including congruent and
incongruent trials. Our predictions were as follows. If the effect of language status on
children’s inhibitory control only exists, then Korean-English bilingual children should
show higher accuracy on incongruent trials than Canadian English monolingual and
Korean monolingual children. If there is the effect of country-of-origin only, then Korean
children, irrespective of their language status, should demonstrate higher accuracy on
incongruent trials compared to Canadian English monolingual children. If there are the
effects of language status and country-of-origin on children’s inhibitory control, KoreanEnglish bilingual children would make fewer errors on incongruent trials compared to
Korean monolingual children, who would be expected to make fewer errors than
Canadian English monolingual children, but all the three groups would perform
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comparably on congruent trials. Furthermore, to better understand possible country-oforigin differences in children’s inhibitory control, survey measures of cultural values
(Individualism-Collectivism) and parenting attitudes (authoritarian and authoritative)
were obtained from parents of all children.

2.1 Methods
2.1.1

Participants

Participants included 112 children aged between 3.5 and 5.5 years of age. This sample
consisted of 36 Caucasian English monolingual speakers living in Ontario, Canada; 43
Korean monolingual speakers living in and around Seoul, Korea; and 33 Korean-English
bilingual speakers living in Ontario, Canada. Of these 112 children, 3 were excluded
from the analysis. These included two English monolingual children whose parents were
not Caucasian, and one bilingual child whose parent classified them as monolingual. An
additional 10 children had to be dropped for various reasons including: experimenter
error (one Korean monolingual child); computer failure (one Korean monolingual child);
incomplete Stroop data (one Korean monolingual child), and early withdrawal of
participation1 (seven Korean monolinguals). Thus, the final sample consisted of 99
children, and included 34 English monolinguals who lived in Canada and whose mother
and father were Caucasian (18 females, Mage = 4.44 years, SD = 0.50), 33 Korean
monolinguals who lived in Korean and whose mother and father were Korean (18
females, Mage = 4.30 years, SD = 0.57), and 32 Korean-English bilinguals who lived in
Canada and whose mother and father were Korean (13 females, Mage = 4.71 years, SD =
0.58). Groups differed in age, F (2, 96) = 4.70, p = .011, with Korean-English bilinguals
older than Korean monolinguals (p = .01), but no difference between English
monolinguals and Korean-English bilinguals (p = .140) nor between English

1

All seven Korean monolingual children withdrew from the study during the PPVT due to boredom. Since
the Korean PPVT-R was conducted using a pencil-and-paper version whereas the English PPVT-4 was
conducted using a tablet, it is assumed that the unequal data attrition among the groups is caused by the
difference in methods of administering the PPVTs.
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monolinguals and Korean monolinguals (p = .917). This study was approved by Human
Research Ethics board at Western University and Yonsei University (see Appendix A).

2.1.2
2.1.2.1

Tasks and measures
Language status

Bilingual/monolingual language status was assessed in two ways. First, children were
administered the English (and/or Korean) version of the Peabody Picture Vocabulary Tests
(PPVT; English version of the PPVT - fourth edition, Dunn & Dunn, 2007; Korean version
of the PPVT-Revised, Kim, Chang, Yim, & Beak, 1995), a standardized assessment of
receptive vocabulary. Second, parents completed a daily language use survey on behalf of
their children (Bialystok, 2010). The survey solicited information about children’s daily
language use in various contexts (e.g., with family, with friends, at preschool/daycare,
when watching TV/movies, and when counting or doing math)2. Scores ranged from 1
(only his/her first language) to 5 (only his/her other language) for all questions. Parents
were also asked to report the proportion of each day their child used their first language on
average (see Appendix B).

2.1.2.2

Socio-economic status

Socio-economic status (SES) was assessed by means of a survey administered to parents
(see Appendix B). The survey solicited information about the family’s social and
economic position in their local society, including the parent’s subjective perception of
their family’s relative income level (i.e., compared to other families in the country you
live in, your family income level is 1: not very much – 5: very wealthy), and paternal and
maternal education level (1: No education, 2: Elementary, 3: High school, 4:
College/professional school, 5: Undergraduate, 6: Graduate or Medicine).

2

Due to experimenter error, Korean monolinguals’ language use when watching TV/movies and when
counting/doing math was not measured.
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2.1.2.3

Individualism-Collectivism

Parental cultural value orientation was assessed using Triandis and Gelfand's (1998)
Individualism-Collectivism Scale (INDCOL; see Appendix C). The INDCOL Scale has
27 items that measures 4 different subscales: Horizontal Individualism (HI; 5 items),
which reflects how much an individual values social autonomy; Horizontal Collectivism
(HC; 8 items), which reflects how much an individual values social interdependence;
Vertical Individualism (VI; 8 items) which measures how much an individual values
opportunities for distinction; and Vertical Collectivism (VC; 6 items), which reflects how
much an individual accepts social hierarchy and collective decision making. Parents
responded to each the 27 items using a 9-point scale (1: Never or definitely no – 9:
Always or definitely yes).

2.1.2.4

Authoritative and Authoritarian Parenting Attitudes

Parental child-rearing attitudes was assessed by means of the short version of Block
(1981)’s Child-rearing Practices Report (CRPR; see Appendix D). Parents answered each
of the 68 survey items using a 5-point Likert scale (1: Strongly agree – 5: Strongly
disagree). Following the method of Kochanska, Kuczynski, & Radke-yarrow (1989),
authoritarian parenting attitudes were estimated from items measuring punishment
orientation, high power parenting/control, and parental rejection, whereas authoritative
parenting attitudes were estimated from items measuring parental acceptance,
encouragement of independence/achievement, and low power parenting/induction.

2.1.2.5

Inhibitory control

Inhibitory control was measured by means of an age-appropriate modified colour-word
Stroop task. The task was administered on a touch-screen tablet (ASUS Transformer
Mini T102H tablet) running custom software implemented in Python using PsychoPy
version. 1.85.6 (Peirce, 2009). Each trial presented two ellipses, one red and one blue. On
half of the trials, the red ellipse appeared on the left; on half of the trials, it appeared on
the right. The relative position of the two ellipses switched randomly from trial and to
trial. Trials began with a white fixation cross, followed one second later by the two
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coloured ellipses, followed 500ms later by an audio recording of the word “red” or
“blue.” Ellipses remained visible until the participant made a response. On incongruent
trials, children were instructed to touch the blue (or red) circle when they heard the word
“red” (or “blue.”) On congruent trials, children were instructed to touch the blue (or red)
circle when they heard the word “blue” (or “red.”) The entire task consisted of 1 block of
12 incongruent trials (6 with the word “red” and 6 with the word “blue”) followed by one
block of 12 congruent trials (6 with the word “red” and 6 with the word “blue”), with the
order of trials within blocks randomized for each participant but block order fixed for all
participants. To ensure children fully understood the rules for each trial type, each block
started only after children responded correctly to two practice trials. On every trial, the
tablet recorded the accuracy and latency of participant responses.

2.1.3

Procedure

Parents provided informed and written consent to their own and their child’s
participation, and children provided verbal assent to their participation. Children were
tested individually by trained research assistants in one session that lasted approximately
30-40 minutes. The full protocol included additional measures not reported here that were
administered as part of a larger cross-cultural study of kindergarteners’ social cognition.
English (or Korean) monolingual children were tested in a child development laboratory
in Ontario Canada (or Seoul South Korea) by native English speakers (or a native Korean
speaker). Korean-English bilingual children were tested in Ontario Canada in a quiet
room in a local church by Korean-English bilingual speakers.
Two steps were taken to avoid inconsistencies in the administration of the protocol across
experimenters and settings. First, all experimenters adhered to a common script that
included a fixed set of task instructions for each component of the protocol. The script
and survey measures were translated from English into Korean, and then back-translated
into English, and corrected for inconsistencies. Second, English and Korean versions of
the modified Stroop task that served as the core measure of children’s inhibitory control
were implemented on touch-screen tablet computers (shipped from Canada to South
Korea) and used for all testing.
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Task order was pseudo-randomized across participants, and breaks were provided as
needed. To avoid unnecessary test burden, Korean-English bilinguals were administered
the English version of the PPVT at the beginning of testing and the Korean version of the
PPVT at the end of testing. Parents completed the surveys in a private space as their
children were tested nearby.

2.2
2.2.1

Results
Language status

Missing data included one Korean-English bilingual participant’s Korean receptive
vocabulary score (the child did not complete the test), one Korean-English bilingual
participant’s English vocabulary score (computer failed to save the data), and one
Korean-English bilingual child’s daily language use survey score (parent did not
complete the survey). Descriptive statistics for receptive vocabulary and daily language
use are reported in Table 1 and confirmed that monolingual and bilingual children
showed daily language use and proficiency in one and two languages respectively.

2.2.2

Socio-economic status

Missing data included measures of perceived SES from two parents (one Caucasian
Canadian parent, one Korean parent living in Korea), measures of paternal education
level from four parents (two Caucasian Canadian parents and two Korean parents living
in Korea), and measures of maternal education level from one parent (one Korean parent
living in Korea). Data were missing either because the parent was single or refused to
report. SES measures for the separate groups are reported in Table 1. Separate one-way
analyses of variance (ANOVA) with group as a between-subjects factor confirmed no
difference between groups in perceived relative economic status (p = .762) and maternal
educational level (p = .270). Paternal education level, however, differed for the three
groups, F (2, 92) = 3.94, p = .023, η2p = .079, being slightly higher for fathers of KoreanEnglish bilingual children compared to fathers of English monolingual children (p =
.020). There was no difference in the education level of fathers of English and Korean
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monolinguals (p = .272) nor in the education level of fathers of Korean monolinguals and
Korean-English bilinguals (p = .891). In sum, groups were of comparable SES.

Table 1. Participants’ means (and standard deviations) of daily language use, Peabody
Picture Vocabulary Tests (PPVT) scores, and socio-economic background questionnaire
Language group
Variable

English

Korean-English

Korean

monolingual

bilingual

monolingual

Daily L1 (child’s First language) Use
With their family

1.00 (0)

2.41 (0.84)

1.15 (0.36)

With their friends

1.00 (0)

3.00 (0.95)

1.09 (0.29)

At preschool/ daycare

1.00 (0)

4.16 (1.11)

1.27 (0.57)

Watching TV/movie

1.12 (0.33)

3.09 (0.78)

-

Counting/doing math

1.06 (0.24)

3.47 (0.80)

-

Proportion of L1 use (%)

99.88 (0.48)

54.84 (21.11)

97.09 (4.77)

PPVT-4: Eng.

85.91 (21.39)

56.48 (19.85)

-

PPVT-R: Kor.

-

35.48 (15.86)

52.52 (22.02)

PPVT raw Scores

Socio-economic Background Questionnaire
Subjective SES

3.09 (0.72)

3.00 (0.76)

3.13 (0.61)

Paternal education

4.41 (0.80)

5.00 (0.84)

4.77 (0.92)

Maternal education

4.71 (0.80)

5.00 (0.57)

4.78 (0.87)
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2.2.3

Inhibitory control

As is typical of 4- to 5-year-old children, 77% of the participants were either
systematically correct (61% of the participants showed above 80% accuracy) or
systematically incorrect (16% of the participants showed below 20% accuracy) on
incongruent trials of the modified Stroop task, limiting the number observations required
for response time analysis. Analysis therefore focused on accuracy.
We sought to disentangle language status and country-of-origin interpretations that are
confounded in the previous literature. For this, we compared Korean monolingual
children’s Stroop task performance with that of Korean-English bilingual and English
monolingual children (see Figure 1). All three groups showed a high rate of accuracy on
congruent trials (Korean monolingual group: M = 80.81, SD = 33.56); however Korean
monolingual (M = 92.68, SD = 12.97) and Korean-English bilingual children showed
higher accuracy on incongruent trials than did English monolingual children. A 3 Group
(Korean monolingual, Korean-English bilingual, English monolingual) x 2 Condition
(incongruent versus congruent) mixed ANOVA confirmed a significant interaction of
Group and Condition, F (2, 96) = 5.02, p = .008, η2p = .095, which remained significant
after controlling for group differences in age, F (2, 95) = 5.14, p = .008, η2p = .098. To
identify the source of the interaction, we performed two one-way ANOVAs, one that
examined the effect of Group on congruent trial accuracy, and a second that examined the
effect of Group on incongruent trial accuracy. There was no effect of Group on congruent
trial performance, F (2, 96) = 0.13, p = .876, but there was a significant effect of Group
on incongruent trial performance, F (2, 96) = 6.31, p = .003, η2p = .116. Bonferronicorrected pairwise comparisons confirmed both Korean monolinguals and KoreanEnglish bilinguals had higher accuracy on incongruent trials than English monolinguals
(p = .007 and p = .011 respectively), but did not differ from each other (p = 1.000).
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Figure 1. Mean accuracy in each condition during the Red-Blue Stroop task. Error bars
represent 95% confidence intervals.

2.2.4

Individualism-Collectivism

The reliability statistics (Cronbach’s α) for the four subscales from the INDCOL scales
are .629 (HI), .785 (VI), .759 (HC), and .528 (VC), respectively, indicating high internal
consistency for VI and HC, acceptable consistency for HI, but questionable consistency
for VC.
Group means and standard deviations of the four subscales from the INDCOL scales are
shown in Table 2 and Figure 2. Groups means were comparable for VC, F (2, 96) = 1.95,
p = .148, and HI, F (2, 96) = 1.01, p = .368, but differed slightly for both VI, F (2, 96) =
5.43, p = .006, η2p = .102, and HC, F (2, 96) = 4.87, p = .010, η2p = .092. Bonferronicorrected post hoc tests confirmed that Korean parents living in Canada and those living
in Korea had significantly higher VI scores than did Canadian parents, p = .010 and p =
.029, respectively, but did not differ from each other (p = 1.000). As well, Korean parents
living in Korea had significantly lower HC scores compared to both the Korean parents
living in Canada (p = .038) and Canadian parents (p = .016), who did not differ from each
other (p = 1.000).
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Table 2. Parents’ means (and standard deviations) of scores for IndividualismCollectivism Scale (INDCOL) and Child-Rearing Practices Report (CRPR) per each subscale.
English
monolingual

KoreanEnglish
bilingual

Korean
monolingual

INDCOL
Horizontal

6.38 (1.11)

6.19 (1.33)

6.60 (1.01)

Vertical Individualism

4.43 (1.38)

5.29 (1.02)

5.17 (1.03)

Horizontal Collectivism

7.17 (0.78)

7.11 (1.11)

6.47 (1.08)

Vertical Collectivism

6.56 (0.86)

6.72 (0.98)

6.28 (0.87)

Authoritarian

67.71 (8.76)

80.75 (10.21)

84.34 (9.83)

Authoritative

118.33 (8.29)

114.41 (10.30)

58.65 (9.93)

Individualism

CRPR
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9

Score (range: 1-9)

8
7

Eng_mono

6
5

Bilinguals
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1
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Figure 2. Mean scores in each subscale of the Individualism-Collectivism
Scale (INDCOL; HI: Horizontal Individualism, VI: Vertical Individualism,
HC: Horizontal Collectivism, and VC: Vertical Collectivism). Error bars
represent 95% confidence intervals.

2.2.5

Authoritarian and authoritative parenting attitudes

Missing data precluded measures of authoritative parenting attitudes from three parents
(one Caucasian Canadian parent and two Korean parents living in Korea), and measures
of authoritarian parenting for one parent (one Korean parent living in Korea). In all cases,
parents omitted answers to some questions within each subscale. The reliability statistics
(Cronbach’s α) for the two subscales of the CRPR are .973 (the authoritative subscale)
and .738 (the authoritarian subscale), respectively, indicating high internal consistencies
for the both subscales.
Group means and standard deviations of two subscales of the CRPR are presented in
Table 2 and Figure 3. There were group differences on both subscales (for the
Authoritarian subscale, F (2, 95) = 27.64, p < .001, η2p = .368; for the Authoritative
subscale, F (2, 93) = 386.47, p < .001, η2p = .893). Bonferroni-corrected post-hoc
comparisons confirmed that Korean parents, both those living in Canada and those living
in Korea, had higher scores on the Authoritarian subscale than Canadian parents (both p’
s < .001), but did not differ from each other (p = .413). As well, Korean parents living
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Korea had lower scores on the Authoritative subscale than Korean parents living in
Canada and Canadian parents (both p’ s < .001), who did not differ from each other (p =

Score (sum of each subscale)

.301).
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Figure 3. Mean scores in each subscale of the Child-Rearing Practices Report (CRPR).
Error bars represent 95% confidence intervals.

2.2.6

Mediation analyses

As a final analysis, we tested whether parental cultural value orientation or child-rearing
attitudes mediated the association between country-of-origin and children inhibitory
control using a macro developed for SPSS with Model 4 (PROCESS; Hayes, 2013).
Neither parenting variable mediated this association (see Figure 4 and 5).
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Figure 4. Path diagram of mediation analyses examining four subscales of the
Individualism-Collectivism Scale (HI: Horizontal Individualism, VI: Vertical
Individualism, HC: Horizontal Collectivism, VC: Vertical Collectivism) and two
parenting attitudes (Authoritative and Authoritarian parenting attitudes) as possible
mediators of group differences (English monolinguals vs. Korea-English bilinguals) in
Inhibitory Control (Interference effect: accuracy on congruent trials minus accuracy on
incongruent trials). The figures are coefficients from regression analyses. The analyses
indicated that there was no significant mediator of the Group-Inhibitory Control
relationship. *p < .05, **p < .01, ***p<.001.
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Figure 5. Path diagram of mediation analyses examining four subscales of the
Individualism-Collectivism Scale (HI: Horizontal Individualism, VI: Vertical
Individualism, HC: Horizontal Collectivism, VC: Vertical Collectivism) and two
parenting attitudes (Authoritative and Authoritarian parenting attitudes) as possible
mediators of group differences (English monolinguals vs. Korean monolinguals) in
Inhibitory Control (Interference effect: accuracy on congruent trials minus accuracy on
incongruent trials). The figures are coefficients from regression analyses. The analyses
indicated that there was no significant mediator of the Group-Inhibitory Control
relationship. *p < .05, **p < .01, ***p<.001.

2.3

Discussion

The current study compared the performance of bilingual and monolingual
kindergarteners of varied national original on an age-appropriate response inhibition task.
There were several important results.
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First, we replicated evidence that bilingual children of East Asian origin (in the present
study, children from South Korea) make fewer errors in response inhibition tasks than do
monolingual children of North American origin (Bialystok, 1999). This finding may
reflect an effect of language status, such that bilingual children are less prone to
distraction than monolingual children (Bialystok, 1999). However, a second and equally
plausible interpretation is that this finding reflects differences in children’s and their
family’s country-of-origin, given that children from East Asia are less prone to
distraction in inhibitory control tasks than are children from North America (Oh & Lewis,
2008; Sabbagh et al., 2006).
We tested this possibility and found that Korean monolingual children performed
comparably to Korean-English bilingual children but more accurately than Caucasian
Canadian monolingual children. Importantly, group differences in the present study were
not attributable to differences in performance across all trial types, as all three groups
performed comparably on congruent trials. Differences were only evident on incongruent
trials that required maintenance of a response rule and inhibition of a prepotent response.
Nor were group differences in inhibitory control attributable to differences in age.
Although Korean monolingual children were slightly younger than Korean-English
bilingual children, statistically controlling these differences had no impact on the results.
Taken together then, the findings suggest that previously reported differences between
East Asian bilingual and Canadian monolingual children (Bialystok, 1999; Bialystok &
Martin, 2004) relate to differences in children’s country-of-origin rather than their
language status.
Finally, we explored whether country-of-origin differences in children’s inhibitory
control could be explained by differences in either parental cultural values (i.e.,
collectivist versus individualist; Hofstede, 1984; Lewis et al., 2009) or attitudes (i.e.,
authoritarian versus authoritative; Chen et al., 1998; Chen, Dong, & Zhou, 1997; Vinden,
2001). Korean and Korean-Canadian parents were generally more authoritarian and less
authoritative than Canadian parents, but not more collectivist and less individualist
(Clarke-Stewart et al., 2006; Hofstede, 1980). Importantly, neither parenting variable
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explained country-of-origin differences in children’s inhibitory control. Of course, these
findings could simply reflect idiosyncrasies of our sample, the nature of our measures, or
the fact that individuals from East Asia are not always more collectivist and less
individualist than individuals from North America (Oyserman, Coon, & Kemmelmeier,
2002). However, they are certainly at odds with the common assumption that country-oforigin differences in children’s inhibitory control can be easily explained by differences
in parental collectivist/individualist cultural values (Yang et al., 2011). These issues
deserve further research attention.
The critical overarching implication of the present findings though is that previously
reported differences between East Asian bilingual children and Canadian monolingual
children’s inhibitory control (e.g., Bialystok, 1999) were likely not related to differences
in children’s language status, but to differences in children’s and their parents’ countryof-origin. Between-group comparisons are difficult to interpret because they often
encompass variables beyond those of immediate interest (Morton & Harper, 2007). The
current findings suggest that measuring and controlling such variables significantly
attenuates the bilingual advantage in children’s inhibitory control.
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Chapter 3

3

The effects of individual differences in language status
and country of origin on Theory of Mind

Theory of mind (ToM), or the ability to understand other people’s mental states, is crucial
for social adaptation, and shows robust development in preschool-aged children
(Wellman et al., 2001). Indeed, during this period, individual differences in ToM become
increasingly pronounced as the result of a variety of social factors, such as opportunities
for social interaction (Bartsch & Wellman, 1995; Hughes & Dunn, 1998), the presence of
siblings (McAlister & Peterson, 2007), and culture (Vinden, 1996).
Several lines of evidence suggest that ToM is related to EF. First, there is evidence
suggesting that the developmental timetable of ToM parallels that of EF. Children
typically start succeeding on standard false-belief tasks in the preschool period when EF
skills are also rapidly developing (Carlson & Moses, 2001; Zelazo et al., 2003). Second,
performance in ToM and EF tasks are frequently correlated, even when age, gender, and
verbal ability are controlled (Carlson & Moses, 2001; Frye et al., 1995). In addition,
evidence suggests that advances in EF lead to advances on ToM and vice versa. For
example, early EF predicts later ToM (Carlson, Mandell, & Williams, 2004; Hughes &
Ensor, 2007) and early ToM predicts later EF (McAlister & Peterson, 2013). The close
relation between ToM and EF can also be found in brain studies. There are common brain
regions such as the prefrontal cortex, that activate in association with both ToM and EF
tasks (Channon & Crawford, 2000; Frith & Frith, 1999; Funahashi & Andreau, 2013;
Koechlin & Summerfield, 2007). These findings suggest that ToM and EF might be
based on a common process.
On the other hand, there is evidence suggesting that ToM and EF are distinct processes.
For example, children with autism show deficits in false-belief tasks but intact
performance in tasks that have similar EF loads but do not involve mental state
reasoning, suggesting that ToM and EF can be dissociated (Charman & Baron‐Cohen,
1992; Leslie & Thaiss, 1992). Several neuroimaging studies (Saxe & Kanwisher, 2003;
Saxe, Schulz, & Jiang, 2006; Saxe & Wexler, 2005) also lend support to the idea that
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ToM and EF are distinct processes. For example, the right temporo-parietal junction
(rTPJ) shows increased activity to stories that involve reasoning about others’ mental
states, but not to stories that involve reasoning about nonsocial events or physical aspects
of a person (social but non-ToM related stories). These findings suggest that the rTPJ is a
ToM-specific brain region.
Thus, it is unclear whether ToM and EF are two facets of the same underlying process or
are distinct processes. As part of examining this question, Experiment 2 tested whether
the effects of country-of-origin (culture) on EF reported in Experiment 1 extend to ToM.
To that end, the identical samples reported in Experiment 1 (the Korean-English (K-E)
bilingual, English monolingual, and Korean monolingual kindergarteners) were
administered two ToM measurements: (1) the “unexpected-contents” false-belief task
where children are shown a container with unexpected content, such as a chocolate box
containing a toy car, and are asked what someone who had never opened the box before
would think was inside; and (2) a modified version of the standard “change-in-location”
false-belief task (Wimmer & Perner, 1983) called the sandbox task. In this task, children
are introduced to two characters who know the location of an object. One character then
leaves and during the first character’s absence, the second character moves the object to
another location. When the first character comes back, children are asked to indicate
where the first character will look for the object. If children understand that the first
character holds a false-belief about the location of the object, they will indicate the
original hiding location even though this departs from their own knowledge and reality.
The advantage with the sandbox task however is that children’s false-belief bias can be
continuously measured by calculating the distance between the original hiding location
and location of the dot they draw.
The predictions were as follows. If ToM and EF are simply two facets of a domaingeneral process, then the effects of country-of-origin (culture) on EF reported in
Experiment 1 should be observed in ToM. In Experiment 1 (Chapter 3), K-E bilingual
and Korean monolingual children outperformed English monolingual children in the
Stroop task, suggesting evidence of cultural effect on EF. Thus, if ToM and EF are based
on a common process, K-E bilingual and Korean monolingual children should also
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outperform English monolingual children in ToM tasks. However, if ToM and EF are
different processes, then the pattern of results for EF (observed in Experiment 1) relating
to language status and country-of-origin and the pattern of results for ToM should be
different. To be specific, children of all three groups are predicted to show comparable
performance on ToM tasks based on the evidence showing universal development of
ToM, irrespective of ToM task types and countries (Avis & Harris, 1991; Lee, Olson, &
Torrance, 1999; Sabbagh et al., 2006; Wellman et al., 2001).
Since a null finding is predicted, and conventional Null Hypothesis Significance Testing
(NHST) is unable to test null effects, the current study conducted not only NHST but also
Bayesian analyses to see which hypothesis (null vs. alternative) can be supported by the
data.

3.1 Methods
3.1.1

Participants

The participants were identical to those in the Chapter 2.

3.1.2
3.1.2.1

Tasks and measures
Language status

The language status measures were identical to those in the Chapter 2 (see Appendix B).

3.1.2.2

Socio-economic status

The socio-economic status measures were identical to those in the Chapter 2 (see
Appendix B).

3.1.2.3

Theory of Mind

Theory of mind ability was measured using two tasks: (1) the “unexpected-contents”
false-belief task and (2) Sandbox task.
First, in the “unexpected-contents” false-belief task (Gopnik & Astington, 1988; Sabbagh
et al., 2006) children were shown a chocolate candy box and asked to report what they
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thought was inside. After responding, children watched as the box was opened to reveal a
crayon (i.e., unexpected contents). Children were then asked: (1) what they had thought
was inside when they first saw the box before they opened it; (2) what someone else who
had not looked inside the box before would think was inside; and (3) what was actually
inside the box. Since the first two questions were related to the ability to infer their own
belief and another person’s belief, children’s answers to these two questions were scored
to provide a total task score between 0 and 2. In addition to the false-belief task, children
were also administered a control task that paralleled the false-belief task but did not
involve mental state inference. In the control task, children were asked to open a box
containing a toy pig, get the toy pig out of the box, and then put a toy horse inside
instead. After doing so, the box was closed, and children were asked: (1) what was inside
the box now; and (2) what had been inside the box before they opened it.
Second, the sandbox task (Mahy, Bernstein, Gerrard, & Atance, 2017) is a variant of the
standard “change-in-location” false-belief task that continuously measures children’s
false-belief understanding. In the current study, a paper and pencil version of the sandbox
task was used. In this task, a protagonist hid an object in Location 1 (L1; marked with an
X). The object was then moved 121mm away to Location 2 (L2; marked with a second
X) during the protagonist’s absence. The task consisted of two different stories. In one
story (false-belief condition), children were asked to mark a dot to indicate where the
protagonist thought the object was. In the other story (memory-control condition),
children were asked to mark a dot to indicate where the protagonist had hidden the object.
Since the correct response to both conditions is L1, children’s scores were calculated as
the distance between L1 and the dot they marked. Greater accuracy on both stories was,
therefore, represented by scores closer to zero, while false-belief or memory biases were
reflected by larger, positive scores. Importantly, the two stories differed in terms of their
processing demands. The false-belief condition required not only the ability to remember
the original location of the object but also the ability to consider the protagonist’s falsebelief of the location of the object (ToM ability). In contrast, the memory-control
condition required only memory of the original location of the object. The dependent
variable for this task, false-belief bias, was calculated by subtracting the memory-control
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condition score from the false-belief condition score. As such, it allowed detection of
small intra-individual differences in ToM ability.

3.1.3

Procedure

The procedure was identical to that in Chapter 2.

3.2
3.2.1

Results
Language status

Descriptive statistics for PPVT scores and daily language use are provided in Table 1 in
Chapter 2.

3.2.2

Socio-economic status

Socio-economic background is reported in Table 1 in the Chapter 2.

3.2.3
3.2.3.1

Theory of Mind
Unexpected-contents false-belief task

A one-way ANOVA was conducted to compare the effect of group on children’s
performance in the unexpected-contents false-belief task (Table 3 and Figure 6). There
was no effect of group, F (2, 96) = 2.438, p = .093, even after controlling for age, F (2,
95) = 2.634, p = .077. Further, the Bayes Factor (with a default Cauchy prior width of
0.707, JASP Team, 2018) suggested inconclusive evidence on which hypothesis of group
(null or the alternative one) was favoured by the data, BF01 = 1.536. However, when
considering both group and age variables using Bayesian ANCOVA, the Bayes Factor
indicated positive and moderate evidence for the null hypothesis, BF01 = 4.746, relative to
the alternative hypothesis.
Table 3. Participants’ means (and standard deviations) of scores for two theory of mind
tasks, respectively. Range for scores on false-belief contents task is 0-2, and scores on
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sandbox task are calculated by subtracting the memory-control condition score from the
false-belief condition score (in millimeter)

False-belief contents task
Sandbox task (False-

False-belief contents task (range: 0-2)

belief bias)

English

Korean-English

Korean

monolingual

bilingual

monolingual

0.94 (0.69)

0.59 (0.71)

0.64 (0.70)

47.82 (90.06)

21.25 (76.44)

17.24 (61.12)

2

1

Eng_mono
Bilinguals
Kor_mono

0

Figure 6. Mean scores in the false-belief contents task. Error bars represent standard
errors.
The three groups also performed comparably in the control condition: English
monolingual group = 1.68 (0.54), K-E bilingual group = 1.78 (0.49), and Korean
monolingual group = 1.70 (0.64). A one-way ANOVA comparing the effect of group on
performance revealed no effect of group, F (2, 96) = 0.323, p = .725, even after
controlling for age, F (2, 95) = 0.085, p = .918. Further, the Bayes Factor (with a default
Cauchy prior width of 0.707, JASP Team, 2018) suggested positive and moderate
evidence for null hypothesis of group effect, BF01 = 8.352. Even when considering both
group and age variables using Bayesian ANCOVA, the Bayes Factor indicated positive
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and moderate evidence for null hypothesis, BF01 = 3.042, relative to the alternative
hypothesis. Thus, the Bayesian analysis suggested that there was a null effect of group.

3.2.3.2

Sandbox task

Missing data precluded one English monolingual child’s false-belief bias score due to
experimenter error. A one-way ANOVA revealed that there was no group difference in
children’s false-belief bias on the Sandbox task (the scores of the false-belief condition
minus the scores of the memory-control condition; see Table 3 and Figure 7), F (2, 95) =
1.540, p = .220, even after controlling for age, F (2, 94) = 1.709, p = .187. Further, the
Bayes Factor (with a default Cauchy prior width of 0.707, JASP Team, 2018) suggested
positive and moderate evidence for null hypothesis regarding the group effect, BF01 =
3.127, relative to the alternative hypothesis of a group effect. Also, when considering
both group and age variables using Bayesian ANCOVA, the Bayes Factor indicated
positive and moderate evidence for the null hypothesis, BF01 = 6.013, relative to the
alternative hypothesis. Again, the Bayesian analysis suggested a null effect of group.

Sandbox (False-belief bias: mm)

100
80

Eng_mono
Bilinguals
Kor_mono

60
40
20
0

Figure 7. Mean scores in the sandbox task. Error bars represent standard errors.
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3.3

Discussion

Experiment 2 investigated whether ToM and EF are based on a common process or they
are distinct by examining if the socio-cultural factors that influence EF extend to ToM.
To that end, bilingual and monolingual Canadian and Korean kindergarteners were
administered ToM tasks, and their performance on the tasks was compared. There were
several important results.
First, when three groups with comparable socio-economic backgrounds (K-E bilingual,
English monolingual, and Korean monolingual preschool-aged children) were compared,
there was no difference among the three groups in two widely used false-belief ToM
tasks (i.e., the “unexpected-contents” and “change-in-location” false-belief tasks).
Despite attempts to detect subtle differences between the groups using a continuous
measurement of “change-in-location” false-belief task (i.e., the sandbox task), there was
no difference in children’s ToM performance, implying no evidence of either a bilingual
advantage or a cultural difference in ToM.
Lack of group difference in ToM task performance contrasts with the results on EF
reported in Experiment 1. In Experiment 1, both K-E bilingual and Korean monolingual
children outperformed English monolingual counterparts in the age-appropriate Stroop
task, suggesting that country-of-origin (culture) has effect on EF. However, in the current
study, all the children showed comparable performance in the ToM tasks regardless of
their language status and country-of-origin, implying that neither language status nor
country-of-origin (culture) have a comparable effect on ToM. These findings are
consistent with the idea that ToM and EF are distinct processes because the effect of
country-of-origin on EF reported in the previous chapter did not extend to ToM.
In a view of one of the critical shortcomings in the previous literature on the relation
between ToM and EF in early childhood, namely, the possibility of independent codevelopment of the two abilities, the current study has important implication. In the
previous literature (Carlson & Moses, 2001; Frye et al., 1995), a significantly strong
correlation between children’s performance on ToM tasks and EF tasks was found even
after controlling for other extraneous variables (e.g., age, gender, verbal ability), and the
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significant correlation was interpreted as evidence showing that these two abilities are
strongly associated with each other. Given that both ToM and EF rapidly develop in the
same period (i.e., preschool period, Carlson & Moses, 2001; Zelazo et al., 2003), it is
possible that the significant correlation simply comes from the independent (but
coincident) co-development of the two abilities. The current study has important features
in that it proposed a new approach, examining whether the pattern of results for one
ability (e.g., EF) due to individual difference in socio-cultural factors is similar to that for
the other ability (e.g., ToM), to investigate the relationship between the two abilities
while being free from the shortcoming that the previous literature might have.
In contrast with the previous findings on bilingual advantage in ToM (Berguno &
Bowler, 2004; Goetz, 2003; Kovács, 2009), K-E bilingual children in the current study
did not show any advantage in ToM compared to English or Korean monolingual
children. Regarding the discrepancy, one critical difference between the previous
literature and the current study is whether or not extraneous variables possibly related to
bilingual advantage (i.e., SES and country-of-origin) are controlled for. Though some
previous studies attempted to control for these extraneous variables (Goetz, 2003;
Nguyen & Astington, 2014), many other studies did not (Berguno & Bowler, 2004;
Farhadian et al., 2010; Gordon, 2016; Kovács, 2009; Kyuchukov & de Villiers, 2009).
Thus, it is possible that bilingual advantage in ToM reported in the previous literature
comes in part from differences in other extraneous variables that have been relating to
ToM, such as SES (Cutting & Dunn, 1999; Pears & Moses, 2003) and country-oforigin/culture (Ahn & Miller, 2012; Liu et al., 2008; Naito & Seki, 2009; Wang, Devine,
Wong, & Hughes, 2016). The importance of controlling for other relevant variables can
also be found in the bilingual advantage in cognitive control. For example, there have
been prevailing results showing that bilingual children are advantaged in a variety of
cognitive control tasks, including response inhibition tasks (Bialystok & Martin, 2004;
Carlson & Meltzoff, 2008; Martin-Rhee & Bialystok, 2008) and working memory tasks
(Blom, Küntay, Messer, Verhagen, & Leseman, 2014; Morales, Calvo, & Bialystok,
2013), compared to monolingual children. However, when attempting to properly control
possible differences in extraneous variables relating to bilingual advantage (i.e., ethnicity,
SES), the bilingual advantage in cognitive control disappeared (Duñabeitia et al., 2014;
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Morton & Harper, 2007). Likewise, no evidence for the bilingual advantage in ToM in
the current study might be due to the attempt to measure and control extraneous variables
relating to bilingual-monolingual group comparison.
Lastly, the lack of difference among the three groups in the current study seems to
correspond with existing literature showing universal development of ToM. For example,
when comparing children from Western culture and from non-Western countries (i.e.,
China, Cameroon), their performance on a variety of ToM tasks was not different,
showing no cross-cultural difference in ToM development (Avis & Harris, 1991; Lee et
al., 1999; Sabbagh et al., 2006). In addition, preschool-aged children show their
consistent and robust development of false-belief understanding, irrespective of task
types and countries of origin (Wellman et al., 2001). The lack of difference in
performance on ToM tasks between Canadian and Korean children in the current finding
can be seen as evidence adding weight to the universal development of ToM.
The critical implication of the present findings is that the current study is consistent with
previous findings suggesting that ToM and EF seem to be distinct processes (Charman &
Baron‐Cohen, 1992; Leslie & Thaiss, 1992; Lough, Gregory, & Hodges, 2001; van der
Meer, Groenewold, Nolen, Pijnenborg, & Aleman, 2011). When seeking whether sociocultural factors influencing EF (i.e., language status and country-of-origin) have
comparable effects on ToM, the current findings suggest that the previously reported
close relationship between ToM and EF (Carlson & Moses, 2001; Frye et al., 1995)
seems to be overestimated due to similar developmental timetables between the two
abilities.
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Chapter 4

4

The relationship between Theory of Mind and Executive
Function: Results from experiments 1 and 2

Experiment 1 examined whether socio-cultural factors (i.e., language status and countryof-origin) are associated with differences in preschool-aged children’s EF. To that end,
bilingual and monolingual preschool-aged children of varied national origin were
compared on an age-appropriate inhibitory control task. The results showed that Korean
children, regardless of their language status, made fewer errors in the task compared to
Caucasian English monolingual children from Canada, indicating that country-of-origin,
not language status, is related to differences in young children’s EF.
Experiment 2 compared the performance of the children studied in Experiment 1 on two
widely used false-belief understanding tasks. The results showed that there was no group
difference in ToM task performance.
In order to see whether the effects of groups on ToM and EF performance, respectively,
are different, one-way MANOVA was conducted with groups as independent variables (3
levels: English monolinguals, Korean monolinguals, and Korean-English bilinguals
groups) and with interference effect in the Stroop task (calculated by subtracting accuracy
on the incongruent trials from accuracy on the congruent trials and then transformed into
Z scores) and false-belief bias in the Sandbox task (calculated by subtracting the
memory-control condition score from the false-belief condition score and then
transformed into Z scores) as dependent variables. There was a statistically significant
difference in ToM and EF performance based on groups, F (4, 188) = 2.645, p = .035,
Wilk's Λ = 0.896, partial η2 = .053, and which remained significant even when
controlling for group difference in age, F (4, 186) = 2.735, p = .030, Wilk's Λ = 0.892,
partial η2 = .056. To be specific, groups have a statistically significant effect on the
interference effect in the Stroop task, F (2, 95) = 4.267, p = .017, partial η2 = .082, but
not on the false-belief bias in the Sandbox task, F (2, 95) = 1.540, p = .220. Tukey HSD
post-hoc revealed that K-E bilinguals and Korean monolinguals significantly
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outperformed English monolinguals on a Stroop task (ps = .054 and .024, respectively)
but they were indistinguishable (p = .950).
The results indicate that the effects of groups on EF demonstrated in Experiment 1 are
different from the effects of groups on ToM shown in Experiment 2. Thus, it suggest that
a group factor did not show analogous patterns of differences in ToM and EF, and which
adds weight to the possibility that ToM and EF are distinct processes.
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Chapter 5 3

5

Introduction

The ability to imagine what other people are thinking, including thoughts that differ from
one’s own, is known as theory of mind (ToM). Converging evidence suggests ToM
ability declines with age (Maylor, Moulson, Muncer, & Taylor, 2002). However, given
that ToM ability depends on at least ToM-specific processes (including inferring mental
states from observed behavior; binding agent representations, propositional attitudes, and
propositional content; and decoupling mental state representations from primary
representations, among other processes) and executive function (EF), it is unclear what
leads to the age-related deterioration of ToM ability. Does it come from the decline of
ToM-specific competence, EF, or both? Here we explore the underlying causes of agerelated decline in ToM ability.
EF is associated with the development of ToM across the lifespan. For example, aspects
of EF including inhibitory control and working memory have been shown to be
correlated with false-belief reasoning in early development (Carlson & Moses, 2001). It
is also well established that EF deteriorates with age (Salthouse, Atkinson, & Berish,
2003), and although this alone does not establish that it is responsible for changes in ToM
among the elderly, it has been also found that the age-related decline of ToM is related to
the deterioration of EF (Bailey & Henry, 2008; Charlton et al., 2009; German & Hehman,
2006; Phillips et al., 2011; Rakoczy, Harder-Kasten, & Sturm, 2012). For example, EF is
significantly correlated with performance on ToM tasks (German & Hehman, 2006) and
even statistically mediates age-related decline of ToM (Bailey & Henry, 2008; Charlton
et al., 2009; Phillips et al., 2011; Rakoczy et al., 2012). While suggestive, these results
are unable to establish whether older adults’ difficulty in ToM is caused by reduced EF or
by decline in ToM competence.
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ToM ability in the elderly has been primarily assessed with elicited-response (or explicit)
tasks (Bailey & Henry, 2008; Charlton et al., 2009; German & Hehman, 2006; Phillips et
al., 2011; Rakoczy et al., 2012). In a common variant, participants observe an object
moved in the presence or absence of an agent and then are prompted to provide a verbal
response indicating where the agent thinks the object is located. Task analyses suggest
these conditions impose high EF load (e.g., inhibiting a prepotent response, Baillargeon,
Scott, & He, 2011).
One previous meta-analysis (Henry, Phillips, Ruffman, & Bailey, 2013) reviewed
existing studies on aging and ToM to see whether there is age-related decline of ToM in a
variety of ToM tasks by categorizing tasks according to domain (i.e., cognitive, affective,
or mixed ToM) and modality of presentation (i.e., dynamic-visual, static-visual, or
verbal). The results showed that older adults performed more poorly than younger adults
across all types of ToM tasks, and it was concluded that ToM decline with age is due to
the elderly’s real deterioration of ToM competence, not due to performance factors.
However, the meta-analysis does not answer whether changes in underlying ToM
competence, EF, or both cause age-related decline of ToM. Critically, since the tasks
entered into the meta-analysis were elicited-response ToM tasks, which impose high
executive demands, it leaves the possibility open that the high performance demands of
those tasks masked an intact, underlying mindreading capacity in the elderly.
In contrast to the elicited-response tasks, spontaneous-response (or implicit) tasks reduce
response-selection and response-inhibition (Scott, 2017). For example, spontaneousresponse tasks (e.g., looking behavior, spontaneous helping behavior) do not require
participants to explicitly generate their responses, needing less non-ToM processing
compared to the elicited-response ToM tasks. During the tasks, participants’ spontaneous
response (e.g., looking behavior) is measured. In the current study, we use a spontaneousresponse ToM task to explore whether the elderly show improved ToM ability when
performance demands are reduced.
An EF-decline account, in which decline in underlying EF is responsible for reduced
ToM ability in the elderly, produces two logically connected predictions. First,
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individuals with compromised EF, such as the elderly, should have difficulty on ToM
tasks that put high demands on EF. The first prediction is supported by many previous
studies (Bailey & Henry, 2008; Charlton et al., 2009; German & Hehman, 2006; Phillips
et al., 2011; Rakoczy et al., 2012). These studies all relied on explicit elicited-response
tasks which impose high performance demands, including EF load. These increased
demands appear to overwhelm the limited EF in the elderly, producing age-related
deterioration in ToM ability. Second, individuals with compromised EF should show
improved performance on ToM tasks that reduce load on EF. While these low demand
tasks have been used extensively with infants and children (Onishi & Baillargeon, 2005;
Southgate, Senju, & Csibra, 2007; Surian, Caldi, & Sperber, 2007), they have not to be
widely used with older adults. The current investigation tests the second prediction. If the
EF-decline account is correct, it is predicted that the elderly in the current study would
show comparable performance to younger adults on a spontaneous-response task which
involves low EF demand.
In contrast, a competence-decline account, in which decline in ToM competence is
responsible for reduced ToM ability in the elderly, predicts worse performance on ToM
tasks in the elderly compared to younger adults for both elicited-response and
spontaneous-response tasks. Reduced demands should be of no benefit if the elderly lack
the concepts and mechanisms to represent and compute mental states.
This sets up a critical test: If ToM competence in the elderly is intact as the EF-decline
account claims, then reducing EF demands should improve ToM performance, but if
ToM competence is not intact as the competence-decline account claims, then reducing
EF demands should not improve ToM performance. To adjudicate between the accounts,
we explored what happens in a low-demand task.
A recent study found that both older and younger adults performed similarly on a
spontaneous-response ToM task, consistent with the EF-decline account that older adults
have preserved false-belief tracking (Grainger, Henry, Naughtin, Comino, & Dux, 2018).
The current study differed in three critical respects: 1) the research was preregistered,
supporting valid null hypothesis significance testing by controlling long-run error rates,
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2) Bayesian analysis was used to quantify evidence for a null hypothesis of no difference
in belief tracking between older and younger adults relative to an alternative hypothesis
that there was a difference, and 3) EF differences between older and younger adults were
measured, not inferred. A brief introduction is suggested here.

5.1 Materials and methods
We preregistered hypotheses described above, an a priori power analysis, and data
analysis plans. Preregistration, stimuli, and data analyses are available on the Open
Science Framework:
[https://osf.io/y7xrq/?view_only=e0fe507f7d9d4420a98b2152d91c2481]. Raw data were
not institutionally approved to be shared on a repository but are available upon request.

5.1.1

Participants

Sixty-seven younger adults and 68 older adults participated in the study. Thirty-seven
younger adults were recruited through a university research participation pool and
received course credit for their participation, and the rest were recruited via poster on
campus and were paid for their participation4. The older adults were recruited from the
local community and were paid for their participation. Prior to collecting data, we
conducted an a priori power analysis using G*Power 3.1 (Faul, Erdfelder, Lang, &
Buchner, 2007). Based on an a priori power analysis with 80% power, a medium effect
size, and an alpha value of .05, we needed 98 participants (49 participants per each age
group).
Out of 135 participants, 37 (18 younger and 19 older adults) were excluded for further
analysis due to failure to look at both object and empty locations in at least one condition
(n = 12, 4 younger and 8 older adults), having a current diagnosis or history of major
psychiatric and neurological illnesses (n = 13, 5 younger and 9 older adults), selfreporting as English as a second language (3 younger adults), failing to complete several

4

This study was approved by Human Research Ethics board at Western University (see Appendix F).
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measures (1 younger adult), or demonstrating signs of depression (n = 7, 5 younger and 2
older adults) measured on the short Geriatric Depression Scale (sGDS; Sheikh &
Yesavage, 1986). For two younger adults, data was obtained from only the first half of
the ToM task (see Procedure section), but their data was included as it met our preregistered inclusion criteria. As a result, the final sample consisted of 49 (34 females)
healthy younger adults (M = 20.37, SD = 3.25, 25 from the Participation Pool) and 49 (37
females) healthy older adults between 60 to 87 years of age (M = 69.37, SD = 7.58).
Older adults reported more years of education than the younger adults (older: M = 16.03,
SD = 3.24; younger: M = 14.08, SD = 2.48, t(96) = 3.34, p = .001). Also, older adults
showed higher scores in verbal subtest of Wechsler Abbreviated Scale of Intelligence
(WASI; Wechsler, 2011) compared to the younger adults (older: M = 41.69, SD = 7.65;
younger: M = 37.47, SD = 6.48, t(96) = 2.95, p = .004). The two age groups were not
significantly different in the Mini Mental State Examination (MMSE; Folstein, Folstein,
& McHugh, 1975), t(59.815) = 1.886, p = .064. Regarding sGDS, older adults showed
lower scores than the younger adults (older: M = 0.59, SD = 0.96; younger: M = 1.96, SD
= 1.56, t(77.730) = 5.20, p < .001).

5.1.2
5.1.2.1

Tasks and materials
General cognitive assessment tasks

To ensure that all participants had normal mental functioning, participants were asked to
complete a simple questionnaire to obtain their demographic data, the MMSE for
screening dementia, verbal subtest of the WASI for obtaining an estimate of their
crystalized IQ, and the sGDS for screening any symptoms of depression.

5.1.2.2

Theory of Mind (ToM) eye tracking task

Forty animations (20 true-belief and 20 false-belief trials) varying in child identity,
animal identity, initial animal location, and room identity, were used. For half of the 40
animations, a child stood behind the box where s/he believed the animal was located at
the end of a trial, whereas for the other half of the animations, the child stood behind the
box where s/he did not believe the animal was located. Therefore, where the child stood
was unrelated to his/her belief about the location of the animal.

47

There were four phases in each trial: Animation phase, Anticipation phase, Fixation
phase, and Response phase. During the animation phase (11 seconds), a child
(protagonist) put an animal in one of two boxes and left the room. At this time, on falsebelief trials, the animal moved out of the box and into the other box during the child’s
absence, whereas, on true-belief trials, the child returned the room first and then the
animal moved out of the box and into the other box. When the child returned to the room
on both types of trials, s/he walked forward, toward the boxes, but stayed in the middle.
During the anticipation phase (4 seconds), the child stood still in the middle. During the
fixation phase (1 second), a white fixation cross appeared on a grey screen. Lastly, during
the response phase, the child stood behind one of the two boxes. At this time, participants
were asked to press one of the buttons (left arrow key or right arrow key) to indicate
whether the child stood behind either the left or right box.
To measure participants’ eye movements, a corneal reflection eye tracker (Tobii x120,
Tobii Technology, Stockholm, Sweden) was used with E-prime software (version
2.0.8.90; Psychology Software Tools Inc., Pittsburgh, PA, USA) and E-prime Extensions
for Tobii (version 2.0.1.26). Specifically, the amount of time participants looked at each
of the two boxes during a five-second-analysis window (including the anticipation phase
and the fixation phase), from after the child returned to the room to before she/he was
about to approach one of the boxes, was measured and used to compute a preferential
looking score ranging from 0 (looking only to the animal box) to 1 (looking only to the
empty box). Since the child believed the animal was in the empty box on false-belief
trials and in the animal box on true belief trials, if participants spontaneously track those
beliefs and make anticipatory eye movements to the location where they expect the child
to search given those same beliefs, they should look more to the empty box on falsebelief trials, than on true-belief trials.

5.1.2.3

Executive function (EF) tasks

Since executive function (EF) refers to a set of multiple cognitive processes for goaldirected behavior (Baddeley, 1996; Miyake et al., 2000), using a variety of EF tasks is
crucial to measure EF. One of the widely used models proposes that EF consists of three
subcomponents including inhibition, updating, and shifting (Miyake & Friedman, 2012;
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Miyake et al., 2000). Based on this model, we measured each of the three subcomponents
of EF with two or more standard tasks in case one task did not fully measure a specific
subcomponent. For inhibition, we used Stroop and Go/No-go tasks; for updating, we used
forward and backward digit span tasks; for shifting, we used Digit Symbol Substitution
Test (DSST, Patel & Kurdi, 2015), Trail Making Test (TMT, Reitan, 1958), and
Wisconsin Card Sorting Test (WCST, Piper et al., 2012). In the Stroop task, participants
were asked to respond to color of a word, not to the name of the word, as quickly and
accurately as possible. There were 180 trials (60 congruent trials, 60 incongruent trials,
and 60 neutral trials). The reaction time and accuracy for each trial were recorded. In the
Go/No-go task, participants were asked to press the Enter key when the Go condition was
met (i.e., whenever the letter ‘W’ appears on a monitor) and not to press anything when
the Go condition was not met (No-Go condition). There were 300 trials in total, and 45
trials out of them were the No-Go condition. Accuracy was recorded, and the false-alarm
rate was analyzed. In the DSST, participants were asked to attend to the symbol
associated with each of nine different digits and then to draw the corresponding symbols
under each digit as quickly as possible in 90 seconds. The number of correct answers was
recorded. Also, in the Digit Span tasks (forward and backward) measuring working
memory, participants heard a series of numbers and they were asked to recall the
numbers in sequence (or in reverse of the presented order). There were three trials in each
section (e.g., in section 2, two numbers were presented, and three numbers were
presented in section 3). If they correctly recalled one of the three trials within the same
section, the task went on. If they gave wrong numbers on all the trials within the same
section, the task was stopped. The number of correct answers was analyzed. In the TMT,
there were two parts to the test: in Part A, participants were required to connect letters in
alphabetical order as quickly as possible and in Part B, they had to connect letters and
numbers alternatingly in alphabetical (letters) and ascending (numbers) order,
respectively (e.g., A1B2C3). Since Part B has been considered an EF measurement, the
total time to complete Part B was measured. Lastly, for the WCST, the Psychology
Experiment Building Language tests (PEBL)’s version of the WSCT (Piper et al., 2012)
was used. Accuracy was analyzed.
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5.1.3

Procedure

The study proceeded in the following order: General cognitive assessment tasks,
calibration phase for the eye tracking task, ToM eye tracking task (the first session; 20
trials), half of the EF tasks, 10-minute break, ToM eye tracking task (the second session;
20 trials), a questionnaire to ensure whether they understood the eye tracking task’s
instructions, and the remaining half of the EF tasks. Half of the participants were given
the Stroop task, Trial making task, and Digit span task as the first half of the EF tasks,
whereas the other half of the participants were given Go/No-go task, Digit symbol
substitution task, and Wisconsin card sorting task as the first half of the EF tasks.

5.2

Results

For the ToM eye tracking task, the ratio of the participants’ looking time to the empty
box on the false-belief trials (or the true-belief trials) to the total looking time to both the
empty and object box on the false-belief trials (or the true-belief trials) was calculated,

Preferential looking ratio to the
empty box (range: 0-1)

producing a looking preference score to the empty box for both conditions (Figure 8).
1
0.9
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0.7
0.6
0.5
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0.1
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Age groups

Older

Figure 8. Preferential looking ratios, with a score of 0 meaning looking only to the
animal box, a score of 1 meaning looking only to the empty box. Error bars represent
standard errors.
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5.2.1

Age differences in spontaneous belief-reasoning

As a confirmatory analysis, age effects on preferential looking ratio to the empty box
were investigated using a 2 (age group: younger vs. older adults) X 2 (belief type: truebelief vs. false-belief) mixed design ANOVA. There was a significant main effect of
belief type, F(1, 96) = 63.61, p < .001, η2p = .399, showing that looking preference to the
empty box was larger in false-belief trials (M = 0.35, SD = 0.29) than in true-belief trials
(M = 0.10, SD = 0.14). This indicates that participants processed the child’s belief about
the location of the animal. No main effect of age group, F(1, 96) = 0.47, p = .493, and no
interaction effect between age group and belief type, F(1, 96) = 0.28, p = .598, were
found. Further, the Bayes Factor (with a default Cauchy prior width of 0.707, JASP,
2018) suggested positive evidence for null hypotheses about the age effect, BF01=4.999,
and the interaction effect, BF01=3.95 relative to the alternative hypotheses of age effect
and interaction effect, respectively.

5.2.2

Age differences in the EF tasks

As a confirmatory analysis, descriptive information on each age group’s performance on
each EF task (raw scores) and the statistical differences for each comparison is shown in
Table 4. For the analysis, dependent measures from all the EF tasks were standardized.
The younger adults significantly outperformed the older adults on all the EF tasks except
the Go-Nogo task and the Digit Span task (both forward and backward).
Table 4. Descriptive information and t-test analyses of age-related differences on EF
tasks.
Younger

Group difference

Older
SD

M

SD

t

df

Inhibition
Stroop effecta (s)

0.10

0.10

0.22

0.19

-3.64

66.813

.001

-0.89

Go/No-gob (%)

4.14

2.38

3.53

2.32

1.27

94

.206

0.26

18.80

2.90

18.60

3.72

0.28

95

.777

0.06

12.10

3.20

11.15

3.57

1.39

95

.168

0.29

Updating
Digit Span:
Forwardc
Digit Span:
Backwardc

P

Cohen’
sd

M
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Shifting
Digit Symbol
Substitutionc

50.76

12.14

34.25

7.65

7.88

75.004

<.001

1.82

TMT_Bd (s)
WCSTc (%)

57.22
76.40

21.35
11.48

79.09
69.92

31.55
12.94

-4.02
2.60

96
94

<.001
.011

-0.82
0.54

a

median reaction time (RT) for neutral condition - the median RT for incongruent condition
false alarm rate
c
the number of correct answers (cf. Digit Symbol Substitution: within 90 seconds)
d
the total time to complete the part
b

5.2.3

Spontaneous belief-reasoning and EF

As an exploratory analysis, correlation analyses between EF and the looking scores in the
false belief condition were explored (we thank a reviewer for this recommendation).
There was no significant correlation between the looking scores in the false belief
condition and EF (all ps > .10). In addition, the Bayes Factor suggested positive evidence
for null hypotheses concerning the correlation relative to the alternative: Go-Nogo (BF01
= 6.231), Stroop (BF01= 4.740), the updating composite score (BF01= 3.593), and the
shifting composite score (BF01= 7.583), suggesting no significant association between EF
measurements and false-belief reasoning.
When correlations between the looking scores in the false belief condition and EF were
broken down by age group, in the older group, there was no significant correlation
between the looking scores in the false belief condition and EF (ps > .090) except for the
updating composite score (r = 0.30, p = .041). In the younger age group, there was no
significant correlation between the looking scores in the false belief condition and EF (all
ps >.50).
However, this analysis should be interpreted with caution for several reasons. First, ToM
and EF could still be related if other unmeasured variables weaken the relationship or
even pull the relationship in the other direction, washing out the correlation. Second,
while a weak or lack of a correlation is consistent with reduced executive demands in the
spontaneous-response task, a strong correlation would still be consistent with lowered
executive demands because the claim is not that spontaneous-response tasks eliminate
executive demands, just that they sufficiently reduce them to reveal underlying
competence better than their elicited-response task counterparts.
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5.3

Discussion

The current study examined whether older adults, known to show age-related decline in
ToM ability when given tasks that impose high performance demands (Bailey & Henry,
2008; Charlton et al., 2009; German & Hehman, 2006; Phillips et al., 2011; Rakoczy et
al., 2012), would track belief when using a spontaneous-response task that reduced nonToM processing. The present finding suggests that older adults track belief when EF
demands are sufficiently lowered, revealing intact underlying ToM competence in the
elderly. Although recent work appears to show a similar result (Grainger et al., 2018),
lack of preregistration and use of p > .05 to argue for no differences in belief tracking
between younger and older adults limit the validity of those results. The current study
was preregistered and used Bayesian model comparison to support valid inference.
This work has several implications. It addresses competence and performance factors in
ToM processing and aging. The elderly’s intact mentalizing ability in the current study
implies that the age-related deterioration of ToM that the previous studies have shown
comes from the elderly’s difficulty in expressing their ToM competence, not from decline
of ToM competence. This study suggests that EF seems to be the underlying sources of
age-related deterioration of ToM that the previous literature have shown.
Several limitations should be considered. First, the older adults in this study had
relatively higher years of education and WASI scores compared to the younger
counterparts, so it is possible that their relatively high functioning allowed them to
compensate for an otherwise reduced ToM capacity in the spontaneous-response ToM
task (e.g., by using non-mentalistic strategy to predict others’ behavior). Closer matching
of participants in future research would address this concern. Second, even though
numerous studies have shown age-related decline of ToM with various elicited-response
ToM tasks, directly comparing older adults’ performance on elicited-response ToM tasks
and closely matched spontaneous-response ToM tasks would be necessary to strongly
claim the existing ToM tasks have heavy EF demands for future studies (cf. Grainger et
al., 2018). Third, not all agree on how to interpret performance in spontaneous-response
tasks. This study assumes they tap a conceptual ToM system rather than a “belief-like” or
non-mentalistic capacity (Apperly & Butterfill, 2009; Perner & Ruffman, 2005), and
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although recent work casts doubt on these alternative accounts (e.g., Hyde, Simon, Ting,
& Nikolaeva, 2018; Király, Oláh, Csibra, & Kovács, 2018), this assumption is still being
debated and tested. Lastly, although the current study suggests that some aspects of core
ToM mechanisms are intact in the elderly, ToM involves multiple sub-systems each with
multiple processes and concepts (Apperly, 2012; Apperly & Butterfill, 2009; Leslie,
Friedman, & German, 2004; Schaafsma, Pfaff, Spunt, & Adolphs, 2015; Warnell &
Redcay, 2019) and it is possible that concepts, processes, or sub-systems not engaged by
the specific task used here are in fact compromised in the elderly.
This study helps illuminate age-related development of ToM, providing evidence that the
deterioration of ToM ability with age is caused by changes in EF, not in ToM
competence. While the competence-performance distinction has long played a role in
explaining the acquisition of abilities in early development (e.g., Chomsky, 1964), the
current work shows the distinction can be put to work to explain changes in late
development as well.
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Chapter 6

6

Discussion

From the standpoint of phylogenetic timescales, there has been an abrupt co-emergence
of several higher-order cognitive functions. Modern humans and their closest
evolutionary cousin, the chimpanzee, are thought to share a common evolutionary
ancestor that existed 5 million and 7 million years ago. In the intervening period, humans
evolved a suite of higher-order cognitive functions, including language, EF, ToM, and
symbolizing abilities. Understanding whether one of these functions evolved first and
served as a foundation for others, or whether different functions developed separately but
in parallel, is extremely challenging because intermediate phenotypes, such as those of
Homo erectus and Homo neanderthalensis, no longer exist and cannot easily be
reconstructed from the archeological record.
Much the same problem is observed when the emergence of these functions is studied on
ontogenetic timescales. Across the lifespan, higher-order cognitive functions show
similar developmental timetables. For example, both ToM and EF rapidly develop within
the early stage of one’s life, the preschool period (Carlson & Moses, 2001; Carlson et al.,
2002; Frye et al., 1995; Hughes & Ensor, 2005), and decline in late-adulthood (German
& Hehman, 2006; McDowd & Craik, 1988; Phillips et al., 2011; Salthouse & Babcock,
1991; Verhaeghen et al., 2003). Thus, the analogous developmental trajectories between
ToM and EF, especially the rapid development of the two abilities in a short period, bring
challenges to testing the nature of the relationship between the two abilities.
Three experiments in the current work explored the relationship between ToM and EF
given challenges to testing the relationship. There were several important findings and
implications that will be briefly reviewed.

6.1 Summary of findings
One empirical challenge to testing the nature of the relationship between ToM and EF is
that the development timetables of ToM and EF are very similar making it difficult to
know whether the relationship between the two is causal or merely statistical. To address
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this challenge, the first two experiments (Experiments 1 and 2) explored whether sociocultural influences on EF have comparable effects on ToM. First, given that language
status (Bialystok & Martin, 2004; Bialystok & Senman, 2004) and country-of-origin (Oh
& Lewis, 2008; Sabbagh et al., 2006) influence children’s EF, Experiment 1 investigated
whether the two socio-cultural factors impact preschool-aged children’s EF. To that end,
Korean-English (K-E) bilingual, Korean monolingual, and English monolingual
preschool-aged children were compared on an age-appropriate response inhibition task.
The results demonstrated that both K-E bilinguals and Korean monolinguals
outperformed English monolinguals in the task, implying that country-of-origin, but not
language status, affects young children’s inhibitory control.
Experiment 2 explored whether the effects reported in Experiment 1 extended to ToM.
To that end, the performance of identical samples reported in Experiment 1 on two
typically used false-belief tasks was compared. The results showed that there was no
difference among the three groups in their performance on the ToM tasks, suggesting that
neither country-of-origin nor language status influences preschool-aged children’s ToM.
In other words, the effect of country-of-origin observed in Experiment 1 (EF) was not
found in Experiment 2 (ToM).
Another empirical challenge to testing the relationship between ToM and EF is that the
strong relationship between the two abilities might actually come from methodological
artifacts. For example, high cognitive loads that ToM tasks typically impose to perform
might make the two abilities appear to be strongly correlated. To address this issue,
Experiment 3 examined whether older adults, believed to have age-related decline of
ToM due to their deficits in EF with age (Bailey & Henry, 2008; Charlton et al., 2009;
German & Hehman, 2006; Phillips et al., 2011), show difficulty in tracking others’
beliefs even when using a ToM task with a reduced cognitive load. To that end, young
adults and older adults were compared on a spontaneous-response ToM task (which
requires low cognitive load to perform) and a variety of EF measurements. The results
exhibited that older adults tracked belief to same extent as young adults when cognitive
demands in a ToM task were reduced, in spite of their deficits in EF. It suggests that
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correlations between ToM and EF performance might be artificially increased due to the
high cognitive demands that most of ToM tasks impose.

6.2
Implications on the relationship between Theory of
Mind and Executive Function
Regarding the relationship between ToM and EF, two possibilities have been proposed:
(1) ToM and EF are two facets of the same process; (2) ToM and EF are distinct (but
coincidently developed) processes. In regard to the first possibility, ToM (specifically,
false-belief understanding) has been suggested to be merely one form of EF using higherorder rules (e.g., Cognitive Complexity and Control theory; Frye et al., 1998). According
to this idea, it may be possible that a common domain-general process is involved in both
the response inhibition task used in Experiment 1 and the false-belief tasks used in
Experiment 2. For example, to successfully perform the false-belief tasks, the ability to
switch judgments using if-if-then rules (e.g., if a character in the tasks saw that an object
was located in A, if he/she did not see the change of the object’s location (from location
A to location B), then location A; if he/she saw that an object was located in A, if he/she
saw the change of the object’s location to B, then location B) might be involved.
Likewise, the identical reasoning ability to switch judgments might be necessary for
successfully performing the response inhibition task (e.g., if it is an incongruent
condition, if a computer says “red”, then pressing a blue circle; if it is a congruent
condition, if a computer says “red”, then pressing a red circle). If ToM and EF are based
on the same cognitive process (e.g., using if-if-then rules), advance in one ability (e.g.,
EF) should lead to advance in the other ability (e.g., ToM). The results from Experiments
1 and 2, however, challenge the first possibility in that differences in response inhibition
associated with country-of-origin did not extend to differences in performance on ToM
tasks.
The results from Experiments 1 and 2 seem to support the second possibility in that the
analogous effects of sociocultural factors (i.e., country-of-origin and language status) on
EF (reported in Experiment 1) did not extend to ToM. In addition, previous findings
(Sabbagh et al., 2006; Wang et al., 2016) add weight to this possibility. For example,
Chinese preschoolers outperformed U.S. counterparts on a variety of EF measurements,
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but were indistinguishable from U.S. children on several ToM tasks, suggesting that
differences in EF possibly associated with country-of-origin do not extend to differences
in ToM (Sabbagh et al., 2006).
If the second possibility is correct, however, it is still complicated to explain the myriad
of evidence showing the strong correlation between ToM and EF (e.g., Carlson & Moses,
2001; Frye et al., 1995; Hughes & Ensor, 2007; McAlister & Peterson, 2013). If ToM and
EF are distinct processes, why are EF and ToM measures frequently correlated? The
results of Experiment 3 offer one possibility.
In Experiment 3, older adults with their age-related deterioration of EF showed intact
belief-tracking ability when using a low-demand ToM. Given that (1) the age-related
decline of ToM is attributable to the age-related deterioration of EF (Bailey & Henry,
2008; Charlton et al., 2009; German & Hehman, 2006; Phillips et al., 2011) and (2) ToM
tasks typically require high cognitive demands to perform (i.e., elicited-response tasks),
the results suggest that high cognitive load that the elicited-response tasks impose might
be the underlying sources of age-related decline of ToM that previous literature has
reported. Thus, the results from Experiment 3 support the possibility that methodological
artifacts lead to a seemingly interdependent but, in truth, independent relationship
between ToM and EF.
Regarding how EF relates to ToM (i.e., emergence5 and expression accounts), the results
from experiments 1 and 2 do not seem to support the expression account whereas the
result from experiment 3 does. Under the expression account, it is predicted that (1) an
advance in EF (in other words, an advance in the ability to express one’s mentalizing
ability) should lead to an advance in ToM task performance and (2) lowering EF
demands of a ToM task should lead to increased or intact ToM ability in the elderly.
Although the results from the experiment 3 seems to be consistent with this prediction,

5

Since the current work did not involve a longitudinal design or training effect, it is not possible to
conclude anything about a causal relationship between ToM and EF (i.e., whether EF is necessary for ToM)
from the current work.
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the results from experiments 1 and 2 do not seem to favour this account in that it showed
that Korean children’s earlier development of EF did not extend to parallel advantage in
ToM compared to Canadian children. The inconsistent findings on the expression account
might come from the limitations of the current work, which will be addressed in the
following section.

6.3

Limitations and future directions

The purpose of the current work is to examine whether ToM and EF stem from one
process or are distinct processes, but there are limitations in addressing this question.
One limitation is that it was not possible to directly test whether socio-cultural variables
(i.e., language status and country-of-origin) are differently related to ToM than EF
through Experiments 1 and 2. In both experiments, there was a lack of bilingual samples
from individualistic cultures (e.g., French-English bilingual children in Canada). As such,
these incomplete 2 (language status: bilinguals vs. monolinguals) x 2 (country-of-origin:
collectivistic vs. individualistic) factorial designs did not allow us to disentangle the
effects of the two socio-cultural variables on ToM and EF respectively, and to see
whether there is the possible interaction of language status and country-of-origin on ToM
and EF.
Future studies are, therefore, necessary to elucidate the impact of socio-cultural variables
on ToM and EF, both independently and collectively. Specifically, future work should
aim to collect an equal amount of data from individualistic and collectivist countries,
allowing for a complete 2 x 2 factorial design in one analysis/study. This will enable
researchers to directly compare the magnitude of the socio-cultural effects on ToM and
EF. In addition, a longitudinal study with complete 2 x 2 factorial designs potentially
allows us to test not only whether the possible interaction exists but also whether
individual differences in one ability (e.g., EF) associated with socio-cultural variables are
related to individual differences in the other ability (e.g., ToM) later in development.
Interestingly, the results from experiments 1 and 2 suggest that sociocultural factor (i.e.,
country-of-origin) influences EF but not ToM, which may seem counterintuitive. For
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example, ToM involves one’s understanding of how others think so that it is highly likely
to be influenced by socialization and cultures, but which is not true in the current results.
The present work attempted to clarify the nature of the sociocultural factor (i.e., countryof-origin) by using questionnaires on parental cultural values and parenting styles, but it
is still unclear. For future studies, it would be interesting to investigate what factor leads
to the observed sociocultural effect on EF but not on ToM by encompassing a variety of
sociocultural measurements.
Although the present work proposes methodological artifacts as a possible basis
underlying the seemingly correlated relationship between ToM and EF, it is difficult to
say that the results from Experiment 3 can be direct evidence of supporting this
possibility. Experiment 3 was lacking in direct comparisons of performance between
closely matched ToM tasks with higher cognitive demands and ToM tasks with lower
cognitive demands. As such, it was not directly tested whether the relationship between
ToM and EF is dependent on the extent of cognitive demand that a ToM task imposes to
perform. To that end, a more direct comparison would enable us to draw better
conclusions about whether or not a highly interrelated relationship between ToM and EF
comes from the incidental EF loads that ToM tasks require to perform. This should be
further addressed in future studies.
One limitation relating to the false-belief eye-tracking task used in Experiment 3 is that
there have been controversies on whether spontaneous-response behaviour (i.e., eye
movement) can be interpreted as indicative of false-belief understanding. On one hand, it
has been proposed that spontaneous-response behaviour can be regarded as evidence
showing the innateness or early onset of ToM competence (Leslie et al., 2004; Onishi &
Baillargeon, 2005). On the other hand, it is suggested that spontaneous-response
behaviour can be explained by behavioural rules (e.g., people are more likely to search
for an object where they last saw it; Perner & Ruffman, 2005) or actor-object-location
associations (Perner & Ruffman, 2005; Ruffman & Perner, 2005). Thus, this issue should
be explored further by future work.
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Conceptual issues relating to the definitions of ToM and EF should also be considered.
For example, ToM has been proposed to encompass a variety of domains (i.e., cognitive
vs. affective ToM; Kalbe et al., 2010; Shamay-Tsoory & Aharon-Peretz, 2007 or implicit
vs. explicit ToM; Schuwerk, Vuori, & Sodian, 2015; Wiesmann, Friederici, Singer, &
Steinbeis, 2017) and levels (i.e., first-order or second-order false-belief reasoning;
Apperly, Samson, Carroll, Hussain, & Humphreys, 2006; Lecce, Bianco, Demicheli, &
Cavallini, 2014) of ToM. In regard to EF, it is difficult to define because (1) EF is an
umbrella term to include a variety of cognitive processes (i.e., inhibitory control, working
memory updating, set-shifting) for goal-directed behaviour and (2) there is no consensus
on the definition EF (Barkley, 2001, 2012). Therefore, it is possible that the relationship
between ToM and EF might be dependent on the definitions or types of ToM and EF. For
example, other subcomponents of EF (i.e., set-shifting and working memory updating)
might have a bidirectional relationship with ToM, whereas inhibitory control might not
have any bidirectionality with ToM (Austin et al., 2014). The relationship between ToM
and EF should be explored further by future studies, which focus on encompassing
diverse domains and types of ToM and EF.
Neuroscience methods may provide deeper insight into the relationship between ToM
and EF given the limitations of behavioural evidence (e.g., mixed results even with
sophisticated study designs; Wade et al., 2018). Based on a few existing neuroscience
findings (Saxe et al., 2006; Scholz, Triantafyllou, Whitfield-Gabrieli, Brown, & Saxe,
2009; van der Meer et al., 2011), the proposal of a completely overlapping relationship
between ToM and EF can be ruled out (Wade et al., 2018) because separable neural
mechanisms underlying ToM and EF (but with some shared brain areas involving both
ToM and EF) have been found. The current work seems to be consistent with the
neuroscience findings in that the results from Experiments 1 and 2 do not support the
possibility of one common process underlying both ToM and EF. Even with existing
neuroscience findings, however, it is still uncertain whether ToM and EF are distinct
processes and whether the shared neural mechanisms are attributable to incidental
cognitive (or domain-general) demands that both ToM and EF tasks impose. Further
neuroscience works may explore this possibility with various approaches (e.g., functional
connectivity between ToM and EF) in the future.
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6.4

Conclusion

The current work tested hypotheses concerning the relationship between ToM and EF by
conducting three interrelated experiments. The results suggest that: (1) ToM and EF are
distinct processes; and (2) methodological overlap between ToM and EF tasks might
inflate apparent correlations between ToM and EF abilities. Given that the similar
developmental trajectories between ToM and EF are one of the key empirical challenges
to elucidate the nature of relationship, the current work provides meaningful
contributions in that it suggests a new framework to investigate the relationship,
examining whether the effects of individual differences in socio-cultural factors on EF
extend to ToM. The current work provides not only important contributions to
understanding the nature of the relationship between ToM and EF, but insight into our
understanding of higher cognitive functions in terms of evolutionary perspectives.
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Appendix B. Language status and demographics survey used in experiments 1 and 2

The questions below will be about YOUR CHILD.
1. The date of your child’s birth
Month:________________________ Day:______________________ Year:_______________________
2. Your child’s gender
(1) Female
(2) Male
3. What is your child’s first language (i.e., the language your child find easiest to
speak, read, and write)?
(1) English
(2) French
(3) Korean
(4) Chinese
(5) Spanish
(6) Other: (specify:_______________________________________)
4. Does your child speak, read, or write other languages?
(1) Yes
(2) No
5. Which one(s)?
(1) English
(2) French
(3) Korean
(4) Chinese
(5) Spanish
(6) Other: (specify:_____________________________________)
6. What language does your child use when s/he is:
6a. With his/her family (i.e., parents, siblings, grandparents, etc.)?
(1) Only his/her first language
(2) Mostly his/her first language
(3) Both his/her first language and other languages
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(4) Mostly his/her other language(s)
(5) Only his/her other language(s)
6b. With his/her friends?
(1) Only his/her first language
(2) Mostly his/her first language
(3) Both his/her first language and other languages
(4) Mostly his/her other language(s)
(5) Only his/her other language(s)

6c. At preschool or day-care?
(1) Only his/her first language
(2) Mostly his/her first language
(3) Both his/her first language and other languages
(4) Mostly his/her other language(s)
(5) Only his/her other language(s)

6d. Watching TV/movies?
(1) Only his/her first language
(2) Mostly his/her first language
(3) Both his/her first language and other languages
(4) Mostly his/her other language(s)
(5) Only his/her other language(s)

6e. Counting or doing math in his/her mind?
(1) Only his/her first language
(2) Mostly his/her first language
(3) Both his/her first language and other languages
(4) Mostly his/her other language(s)
(5) Only his/her other language(s)
7. How many languages does your child speak?
(1) One
(2) Two
(3) More than two
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8. (only if you say “yes” to Question 3) Out of the day, the proportion of your child’s
using his/her first language is approximately (
%) and the
proportion of using his/her other language(s) is approximately (
%).
*The total two proportions should be 100%.
9. How many brothers and sisters does your child have?
(1) None
(5) Four
(2) One
(6) Five
(3) Two
(7) more than 5
(4) Three
If your child has siblings, please specify (i.e., s/he has one younger sister and one
older brother):
_____________________________________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________________________________
The questions below will be about You and Your Spouse (child’s parents).
10. Do you and your spouse (your child’s parents) live together or are you
separated?
(1) Live together
(2) Separated
11. Do you and your spouse work?
(1) Yes, both work
(2) No, only 1 parent works
(3) No, neither of us work
12. What do you and your spouse do for a living?

You: Business owner, Business manager, Office administrator, Engineer/Architect,
Artist/Designer, Entertainer, Media/Communications, Computers/Programmer,
Agricultural/Fisheries (farmer, fisher, etc), Cleaning/Maintenance services,
Scientist, Civilian military officer, Soldier & Veterans, Medical
practitioner/technician, Medical support, Community/Social services, Law
enforcement/Security (e.g., firefighter, police officer), Legal services, Educator,
Transportation services, Personal care/services (e.g., hairstylist), Salesperson,
Professor, Food services, Manufacturing/Factory employee, Construction,
Homemaker, Government
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If your occupation is not included in these categories, please specify your
occupation:
.

Your spouse: Business owner, Business manager, Office administrator,
Engineer/Architect, Artist/Designer, Entertainer, Media/Communications,
Computers/Programmer, Agricultural/Fisheries (farmer, fisher, etc),
Cleaning/Maintenance services, Scientist, Civilian military officer, Soldier &
Veterans, Medical practitioner/technician, Medical support, Community/Social
services, Law enforcement/Security (e.g., firefighter, police officer), Legal services,
Educator, Transportation services, Personal care/services (e.g., hairstylist),
Salesperson, Professor, Food services, Manufacturing/Factory employee,
Construction, Homemaker, Government

If your spouse’s occupation is not included in these categories, please specify
his/her occupation:
.

13. Compared to other families in the country you live in, how much money does
your family have?
(1) Not very much
(2) Less than average, but we are not poor
(3) About the same as an average family
(4) More than the average family
(5) My family is very wealthy
14. What is the highest form of education you and your spouse received?
You: No education; Elementary school; High school; College; University
(Undergraduate); University (Medicine); University (Graduate)

Your spouse: No education; Elementary school; High school; College/Professional
School; University (Undergraduate); University (Medicine); University (Graduate)
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Appendix C. Individualism-Collectivism survey used in experiments 1 and 2

Please read the instructions carefully and answer the questions as spontaneously as possible
using a 9-point. There are no right or wrong answers; we simply ask that you be completely
honest in your responses.
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

Never or
definitely No

1

I’d rather depend on myself than others.
It is important that I do my job better than
others.
If a coworker gets a prize, I would feel proud.
Parents and children must stay together as
much as possible.
I rely on myself most of the time; I rarely rely
on others.
Winning is everything.
The well-being of my coworkers is important
to me.
It is my duty to take care of my family, even
when I have to sacrifice what I want.
I often do my own thing.
Competition is the law of nature.
To me, pleasure is spending time with others.
Family members should stick together, no
matter what sacrifices are required.
My personal identity, independent of others, is
very important to me.
Some people emphasize winning; I am not one
of them.
I feel good when I cooperate with others.
It is important to me that I respect the
decisions made by my groups.

9
Always or
definitely Yes

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9
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1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

Being a unique individual is important to me.
When another person does better than I do, I
get tense and aroused.
If a relative were in financial difficulty, I
would help within my means.
Children should be taught to place duty before
pleasure.
I enjoy working in situations involving
competition.
It is important to me to maintain harmony in
my group.
I usually sacrifice my self-interest for the
benefit of my group.
Without competition, it is not possible to have
a good society.
I like sharing little things with my neighbors.
It annoys me when other people perform better
than I do.
My happiness depends very much on the
happiness of those around me.
1

2

3

4

5

6

Never or
definitely No

7

8

9
Always or
definitely Yes

Thank you for your time!
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Appendix D. Authoritative and authoritarian parenting attitudes survey used in
experiments 1 and 2
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Appendix E. A letter on permission to use copyrighted material for experiment 3
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Appendix F. Documentation of ethics approval for experiment 3
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